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The Constitution and the Public Trust
ROBERT G. NATELSONt
[G] overnments are in fact. . . agents and trustees of the people ....
- James Madison1
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lawrence v. Texas,3 the Supreme Court ruled that a
Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy conflicted
with the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.4 The opinion was written by
Justice Kennedy, who was joined by four of his colleagues.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, basing her
conclusion not on a due process basis, but on the Equal
Protection Clause:'
We have consistently held... that some objectives, such as "a
bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group," are not
legitimate state interests. When a law exhibits such a desire to
harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more
searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws
under the Equal Protection Clause.7
Much of the rhetoric of modern democratic politics
seems based on a "bare desire" to harm politically unpopu-
lar groups. The letters column of many daily newspapers,
and the speeches of many politicians, are filled with attacks
on such groups-not merely, or even chiefly, homosexuals,
but also corporations, bureaucrats, resident aliens, and "the
rich," to name a few. Targeted legislation sometimes is the
result. As Justice O'Connor suggests, the Equal Protection
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. The court stated:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
7. 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Clause sets limits beyond which these official attacks
cannot go.
In an immediate sense, the Equal Protection Clause
emerged from the Civil War and Reconstruction.8 Yet the
underlying standard-that government agents have an ob-
ligation of impartiality to those they serve-was part of a
fiduciary ideal of government service that was omnipresent
years earlier, when the Constitution was drafted, debated,
and ratified.
When the federal constitutional convention met in
1787, most of the state constitutions already contained fi-
duciary language.9 At the federal convention, ideals of fidu-
ciary government were enunciated by James Madison, 10
Alexander Hamilton,1 Pierce Butler,'2 Nathaniel Gorham, 3
Gouverneur Morris, 4 Elbridge Gerry,15 Luther Martin,'6
Rufus King, 7 and John Dickinson. 8 During the ensuing
8. E.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 526.
9. See infra Part IV.E.2.
10. James Madison, Journal (June 7, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 152 (referring to the Roman tribunes "fulfilling
[public] trust"); id. at 361 (June 21, 1787) (referring to the "trust" of
representatives); id. at 428 (June 26, 1787) (stating that senators ought to be
"Guardians of justice and general Good"); 2 id. at 66 (stating of the executive,
"[h]e might betray his trust to foreign powers").
11. 1 id. at 290 (June 18, 1787) ("public trust"); id. at 424 (June 26, 1787)(stating that the House of Representatives was to be "particularly the guardians
of the poorer orders").
12. Id. at 391 (June 23, 1787) (paraphrasing Montesquieu as stating that "it
is unwise to entrust persons with power, which by being abused operates to the
advantage of those entrusted with it.").
13. 2 id. at 42 (July 18, 1787) (referring to the executive's "faithful discharge
of his trust").
14. Id. at 52 (July 19, 1787) ("It is necessary then that the Executive
Magistrate should be the guardian of the people ... ."); id. at 53 (arguing for
popular election of the chief magistrate so he will be the guardian of the people);
id. at 68 (July 20, 1787) (speaking of impeachment as a remedy for breach of
trust); id. at 76 (July 21, 1787) (stating that the legislature should be the
guardian of liberty); id. at 104 (July 24, 1787) (speaking of identity of interest
as preventing an abuse of trust); id. at 541 (Sept. 7, 1787) (referring to the
President as "the general Guardian of the National interests").
15. Id. at 170 (June 8, 1787) (discussing the national legislature's proposed
veto over state laws and his own role as a delegate); 2 id. at 75 (July 21, 1787)
(stating that judges should be the guardians of the rights of the people).
16. 1 id. at 453 (June 28, 1787) (referring to state governments as the
guardians of the people).
17. Id. at 502 (June 30, 1787) (expressing the hope that the general
government will be "the guardian of the state rights").
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public debate over the Constitution, leading proponents of
the new government repeatedly characterized officials as
the people's servants, agents, guardians, or trustees. Among
these proponents were Madison, Dickinson, John Jay,
Tench Coxe,22 George Washington,23 James Kent (the future
New York Chancellor and treatise-writer),24 and many oth-
ers.25 This was a subject on which there was no disagree-
18. 2 id. at 123 (referring to "public trust").
19. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 2, at 263 (discussing the nature
of the legislative "public trust"); id. No. 55, at 289 (denying that Congress was
likely to "betray the solemn trust committed to them"); id. No. 57, at 295
(referring to republican officeholders' "public trust"); id. No. 63 at 325 (stating
the need for a small senate to better protect the "public trust").
20. Dickinson promoted ratification of the Constitution in his "Letters of
Fabius." See, e.g., Fabius II, PENN. MERCURY, Apr. 19, 1788, reprinted in 17
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 122 ("federal trustees"); id. at 124
("undue influence"); id. at 124-25 (affirming that presidential electors will reject
suggestions "derived from partiality"); id. at 125 (referring to the senate's
"trust" in acquiring and preserving information); Fabius IV, PENN. MERCURY,
Apr. 19, 1788, reprinted in 17 id. at 180 (stating that government is a trust for
the benefit of the governed). See also STILLI9, supra note 2, at 204 (quoting
Dickinson as referring to a representative as "a trustee for my countryman,"
and noting a corresponding duty for the representative to subordinate his own
interest to those he serves).
21. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note 2, at 77.
22. Id. at 146; Tench Coxe, An American Citizen III, PHILA. INDEP.
GAZETTEER, Sept. 29, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
2, at 273 (referring to public officers as "servants of the people").
23. George Washington, To the Executives of the States, PROVIDENCE U.S.
CHRON., Mar. 15, 1783, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
70 (referring to his military command as a "public trust"); Letters from George
Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (Apr. 28 & May 1, 1788), in 17 DOC-
UMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 235 (stating that the Constitution guards
against "undue influence in the choice of President").
24. A Country Federalist, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Dec. 19, 1787,
reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 430, 433 (writing as "A
Country Federalist").
25. In addition to the citations collected infra in Part V, see Letter from
Roger Sherman to Unknown Recipient (Dec. 8, 1787), in HUTSON, SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 2, at 286 ("In every government there is a trust, which may be
abused"); Marcus IV, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Mar. 12, 1788, reprinted in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 380-81 (James Iredell, writing as
"Marcus," speaking of powers being "entrusted"); Letter from Benjamin Rush to
David Ramsay (Apr. 14, 1788), in 17 id. at 96 (calling legislators the people's
"servants," speaking of "trusting... power," and referring to "men entrusted
with power"); A Citizen of New York, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 26, 1787,
reprinted in 19 id. at 54 (calling the Presidency a trust); Curtius III, N.Y. DAILY
ADVERTISER, Nov. 3, 1787, reprinted in 19 id. at 174-75 (referring to "office[s] of
place or trust"); Cincinnatus, LANSINGBURGH N. CENTINEL, Oct. 15, 1787,
reprinted in 19 id. at 87-88 ("Why then should we be more fearful or cautious in
entrusting them with power than we now are in trusting the officers of our
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ment from the Constitution's opponents. They very often
used the same kind of language, and based their own argu-
ments on fiduciary principles as well.2"
The same was true at the state conventions that met to
ratify or reject the Constitution.27 Indeed, the delegates at
present government, who are also chosen by and from among ourselves?"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 59, supra note 2, at 310 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the
union should not "be committed to the guardianship of any but those whose
situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and vigilant
performance of the trust"); FRIENDS, supra note 2, at 383 (Noah Webster,
describing a delegate's "trust").
John Adams had opined in 1765 in his "Dissertation on the Canon and
Feudal Law," that "[riulers are no more than attorneys, agents, and trustees,
for the people." ADAMS, WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 28. He repeated this
sentiment the following year under the pseudonym "The Earl of Clarendon." Id.
at 54. Cf WILSON, supra note 2, at 300 (stating in one of his 1790 lectures that
Congress is "intrusted" with legislative power).
26. E.g., The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the
Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents, PENN. PACKET,
Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 618, 636-
37 (claiming that "[tihis large state is to have but ten members in that Congress
which is to have the liberty, property, and dearest concerns of every individual
in this vast country at absolute command, and even these ten persons, who are
to be our only guardians.... ."); Americanus I, VA. IND. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1787,
reprinted in 8 id. at 200-01 (stating that public officials are the servants of the
people); id. at 246 (referring to the authority with which the senate was to be
"entrusted"); Remarks Relative to a Bill of Rights, Maryland Convention (Apr.
12, 1788), in 17 id. at 92 ("A Citizen of the State of Maryland," relying on Lord
Abingdon's trust theory of government); A Republican, N.Y. J., Sept. 6, 1787,
reprinted in 19 id. at 16, 18 (stating that the governor "is from office, one of the
guardians of our liberties"); Observations on Government, Nov. 3, 1787,
reprinted in 19 id. at 181, 184 ("A Farmer of New-Jersey," referring to "[t]he
powers that must necessarily be intrusted in the hands of the President"); Cato
IV, N.Y. J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in id. at 195-96 (referring to "the deposit of
vast trusts in the hands of a single magistrate"); 4 STORING, ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 2, at 25 ("John DeWitt," arguing that "The form [of the constitution]
is the mode in which the people choose to direct their affairs, and the
magistrates are but trustees to put that mode in force"); id. at 26 (referring to
"places of honour and trust"); id. at 27 (referring to "careful guardians of the
rights of their constituents"); 6 id. at 108 ("Sydney," Robert Yates, stating that
.we ought deliberately to trace the extent and tendency of the trust we are
about to repose, under the conviction that a re-assumption of that trust will at
least be difficult, if not impracticable").
27. Fisher Ames, Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 11, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 8-9 (stating that "by their servants [the people]
govern... they delegate that power, which they cannot use themselves, to their
trustees."); Fisher Ames (Jan. 19, 1788), in id. at 46 (referring to the "trust" of
government); William Symmes (Jan. 22, 1788), in id. at 71 (referring to
Congress as "trustees"); Rev. Shute (Jan. 30, 1788), in id. at 119 (referring to
national offices as "national trusts").
Robert R. Livingston, New York Convention (June 23, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 293 (referring to national offices as "stations of
trust"); Alexander Hamilton, in id. at 398 (referring to "trust" and "confidence");
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the Maryland convention described themselves formally as
"trustees of the public."2 The Virginia convention narrowly
approved the Constitution, but with a recommendation that
a "declaration or bill of rights" be added, including the
proclamation, "That all power is naturally invested in, and
consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates
therefore are their trustees and agents, at all times amena-
ble to them."29 The new federal Constitution itself referred
in several places to "public Trust"" and to public offices
being "of Trust." 1
I have not been able to find a single public pronounce-
ment in the constitutional debate contending or implying
that the comparison of government officials and private
fiduciaries was inapt. The fiduciary metaphor seems to
rank just below "liberty" and "republicanism" as an element
of the ideology of the day.
Although the founders frequently used the metaphors of
guardianship, master-servant, and agency to describe the
id. at 388 (referring to governmental agencies as "guardians" and "stewards");
Thomas Tredwell (July 2, 1788), in id. at 404-05 (repeatedly using the language
of "trust").
James Wilson, Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 1, 4, 1787) in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 293 at 443-44, 459, 480 (using the language of public
trust); Thomas M'Kean (Dec. 11, 1787), in id. at 530 (telling the delegates that
their duty "is a sacred trust"); id. at 533 (referring to the trust in the Senate).
Charles Pinckney, South Carolina legislature, considering whether to hold a
ratifying convention (June 16, 1788) in 4 id. at 256 (speaking of "intrust" rights
to the legislature); John Julius Pringle, in id. at 270 (mentioning "betraying" of
public trust); Edward Rutledge, in id. at 276 (referring to abuse of trust by
Senators or the President); General Pinckney (June 17, 1788), in id. at 281
(referring to impeachment as a remedy for breach of public trust).
Governor Edmund Randolph, Virginia Convention (June 10, 1788), in 3 id.
at 204 ("A man of abilities and character, of any sect whatever, may be admitted
to any office or public trust under the United States."); John Marshall, in id. at
225 ("You cannot exercise the powers of government personally yourselves. You
must trust to agents."); id. at 657 (June 27, 1788) (proposed amendment to
Constitution stating, "That all power is naturally invested in, and consequently
derived from, the people; that magistrates therefore are their trustees and
agents, at all times amenable to them.").
28. Maryland Convention (Apr. 21, 1788), in 2 id. at 556; cf Reports of the
Constituional Convention Proceedings, PENN. HERALD, July 28, 1787, reprinted
in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 125 (describing the federal
convention as an "important trust").
29. Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in id. at 657.
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ("Office of... Trust"); id., art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id.,
art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Office of Trust").
THE PUBLIC TRUST
relationship between elector and elected, the phrase they used
most often was "public trust." In this article, therefore, I often
refer to the ideal of fiduciary government as the public trust
doctrine. The Founders' public trust doctrine was far more
comprehensive than modern tenets that share the name.32
Justice Stephen Breyer has pointed out that the
"general purposes" behind the Constitution-the values the
document was designed to further-should assist courts in
construing the Constitution, just as the underlying goals of
any other document assist in understanding it. In this
Article, I explore whether the recurrent references to the
public trust were merely empty phrases or whether it really
was a "general purpose" of the founders to impose fiduciary
standards on the federal government. After concluding that
the latter is true, I then explore what some implications of
that finding that might be.
Part I of this Article is this Introduction. Part II lists
some fiduciary duties potentially applicable to government.
Part III summarizes for the reader the process by which the
Constitution was drafted, debated, and ratified. Part IV ex-
amines works by some of the Founders' favorite political
and legal authors and finds that those authors frequently
advocated imposing fiduciary standards on government offi-
32. One modern "public trust doctrine" is that the state holds lands
submerged beneath navigable waterways in public trust. The leading case is Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Another modem public trust
doctrine is the rule, applied in some states, that some or all natural resources
are held in public trust. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-15 (1958):
Declaration of policy[:]
It is hereby found and declared that there is a public trust in the air,
water and other natural resources of the state of Connecticut and that
each person is entitled to the protection, preservation and
enhancement of the same. It is further found and declared that it is in
the public interest to provide all persons with an adequate remedy to
protect the air, water and other natural resources from unreasonable
pollution, impairment or destruction.
For short surveys of the doctrine and citations to the literature, see Joseph L.
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); James R. Rasband, The Public Trust
Doctrine, A Tragedy of the Common Law, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1999)
(reviewing BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY,
LAW, AND ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY (1998)).
33. Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 247-48 (2002) ("[The Constitution's] handful of general
purposes will inform judicial interpretation of many individual provisions that
do not refer directly to the general objective in question.").
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cials. Part V discusses the role of public trust concepts in
the drafting, submission, and ratification of the Constitu-
tion. Part VI suggests some implications for modern
American constitutional interpretation, while Part VII
summarizes my conclusions.
II. SOME FIDUCIARY DUTIES POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE TO
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
If the public trust doctrine has a meaning beyond the
romantic, it is that public officials are legally bound to
(appropriately adapted) standards borrowed from the law
regulating private fiduciaries." Generally speaking, the law
applying to private fiduciaries imposes higher standards on
managers as the potential consequences of breach of duty
become more serious, and as it becomes more difficult for
beneficiaries to avoid those consequences.35 In the public
sector, of course, the consequences of governmental abuse
can be very serious, potentially including not merely the
loss of a citizen's property, but of life, liberty, or reputation.
Avoidance of consequences of governmental abuse is diffi-
cult, because while citizens can elect most higher officials,
the bureaucracy is effectively beyond direct citizen control
and exit from the government-citizen relationship requires
physically removing oneself from the government's territo-
rial jurisdiction.36 For these reasons, the logic of fiduciary
law suggests that the standards of conduct binding public
trustees ought to be fairly demanding.
In addition to certain obvious moral norms, such as not
absconding with the public till, there are at least five broad
fiduciary obligations potentially relevant to government
officials: (1) the duty to follow instructions, (2) the duty of
reasonable care, (3) the duty of loyalty, (4) the duty of im-
partiality, and (5) the duty to account. The first of these is
the obligation to act in accordance with the purpose and
34. See Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary, supra note 2, and sources
cited therein, for the rules of fiduciary government and an historical
application.
35. See id. at 194-98.
36. See id. at 199-200. In contrast, escape from an undesirable corporate
board of directors usually entails no more than sale of stock.
37. See id. at 200.
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rules of the relationship as set forth in the governing in-
struments.8 In the government context, this means that
officials should work only in accordance with the purposes
of their offices and honor the rules set by pre-established
law and administrative regulations. The duty of reasonable
care39 applies irrespective of good intent" and comprehends
obligations to manage assets competently,41 select and su-
pervise agents diligently,42 and undertake appropriate
factual and legal investigations43 before making decisions.
The duty of loyalty is the fiduciary's obligation to subordi-
nate his own interests to the welfare of the beneficiaries.44
Acting in a self-serving way ("self-dealing") violates the
duty of loyalty because of the risk that the fiduciary may be
enriched at the expense of the beneficiary. 4 The duty of
impartiality requires the decision maker to avoid favoring
some beneficiaries over others, unless otherwise directed by
38. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 541 at 161-62.
39. Id. § 541, at 167 ("[T]he trustee is required to manifest the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence of an ordinarily prudent man engaged in similar
business affairs and with objectives similar to those of the trust in question");
see also BOGERT & HESS, supra note 2, § 612, at 13; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
40. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 541, at 177 ("[Tlhe duty to use the
care and skill of an ordinarily prudent man is absolute. The fact that the
trustee was honest and well intentioned will not excuse him from the
manifestation of the required amount of diligence and prudence.").
41. Cf id. § 541, at 167; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 179 (1959)
(duty to keep funds separate); see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 541, at
160-61 (duty to collect and preserve trust principal); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 177 (1959) (duty to enforce claims).
42. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TRUSTS 335 (5th ed. 1973) (duty to use reasonable care in selection
and supervision of agents); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 171 (1959).
43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) §
227 cmt. h, (1992) (mentioning investigation as part of a prudent investment
strategy). See also BOGERT & HESS, supra note 2, at 32-36 (using expert advice
in investing).
44. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 543, at 217; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959). The extent of the required subordination depends on
the sort of relationship in which the duty arises. For example, the manager who
is also a beneficiary, such as a general partner, need not subordinate his
interest as completely as a private trustee. Arguably, such a common-enterprise
relationship is not truly fiduciary, but occupies a point on the spectrum between
arms-length and truly fiduciary relationships. See Natelson, The Government as
Fiduciary, supra note 2, at 197-98.
45. E.g., BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 543(A), at 271 (explaining that
trustees are not permitted to buy at their own sales).
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the governing documents." Thus, a trustee, for example,
must act with due regard to each beneficiary's respective in-
terests.47 By analogy, public trustees should avoid targeting
particular constituencies for favor or for punishment.
Finally, the fiduciary has a duty to account for his conduct,
including an obligation to repair any harm caused by
breach.4 (In the public context today, the duty to account is
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959):
§ 183. Duty to Deal Impartially with Beneficiaries[:]
When there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is
under a duty to deal impartially with them.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section is applicable whether the
beneficiaries' interests in the trust property are concurrent or
successive.
On this point, see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 541, at 163-66;
BOGERT & HESS, supra note 2, § 612, at 49-57.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 (1959):
§ 232. Impartiality between Successive Beneficiaries[:]
If a trust is created for beneficiaries in succession, the trustee is under
a duty to the successive beneficiaries to act with due regard to their
respective interests.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section is an application of the broader rule
stated in § 183 that where there are two or more beneficiaries of a
trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them. That
rule is applicable whether the beneficiaries are entitled to interests in
the trust property simultaneously or successively....
d. To what duties the Section is applicable. The rule stated in this
Section is applicable to the duty of the trustee in making or continuing
investments, to the general management of the trust estate, the
making of repairs and replacements and to the allocation of receipts
and expenditures between principal and income accounts.
See also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 541, at 171.
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sharply limited.)49 Only if fiduciaries honor all these duties,
does the law grant them a fairly broad realm of managerial
discretion."
As we shall see, the Founders' definition of public trust
comprehended all five of these standards.
III. THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL
A knowledge of the process by which the Constitution
was drafted, debated, and ratified is helpful in under-
standing how particular values, such as the public trust
doctrine, influenced the meaning of the instrument. By
1786, most opinion makers had concluded that the Articles
of Confederation were not an adequate frame for American
government, and that a stronger central authority was
needed. Successive calls for change came from Congress,
the Commonwealth of Virginia, the Annapolis Convention
(attended by five states), and then again from Congress. In
response, twelve states sent delegates to a Constitutional
Convention that met in Philadelphia from May to Septem-
ber, 1787."l
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959) (trustee's duty to
furnish information to beneficiary); id. § 243 (explaining that breach of trust
may result in reduced or no compensation).
49. Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary, supra note 2, at 200-02.
50. Even trustees, possibly the most constrained of fiduciaries, enjoy
significant discretion within the limits of their fiduciary duties. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959) (explaining that where
discretion is granted to a trustee, the exercise is not subject to control of a court
except to prevent abuse); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (PRUDENT INVESTOR
RULE) § 227, cmt. b, illus. 3-4 (supporting discretion of trustee exercised in
compliance with fiduciary duties, despite investment losses). See also id. § 171,
cmt. f (delegation of authority); id. § 228, cmt. g (investment).
Managers of corporations, where (unlike governmental entities) exit by the
beneficiaries is usually easy (by sale of shares), have somewhat more discretion.
This is reflected by the "Business Judgment Rule." See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN
R. ALEXANDER, LAwS OF CORPORATIONS 661-63 (3d ed. 1983).
51. This course of events has been documented too many times to require
detailed citation. See, e.g., Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia:
The Story of the Constitutional Convention, May to September 1787 (1966);
McDonald, supra note 2; Rossiter, supra note 2.
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Although most people agreed that the central govern-
ment should have more authority, there was sharp
disagreement about how much more. The balance of power
between states and central government was the central
issue in the ensuing constitutional debates, and other dis-
putes-such as the debates about the composition of Con-
gress and the advisability of a bill of rights-were largely
derivative of it.52 The disagreement among the general pub-
lic was reflected at the Federal Constitutional Convention,
but with a significant qualification: Among Convention
delegates there was a higher percentage of "nationalists"
than among the voting public. The Convention majority ini-
tially leaned toward a plan of government propounded by
the Virginia delegation (the "Virginia Plan") that would
have created a national government with sweeping and in-
definite authority and with power to veto state laws.53 As
the deliberations wore on, however, the Convention began
to realize that so much nationalism was perhaps unwise
and certainly too strong for public consumption. During the
last two months of the convention, therefore, the delegates
52. For example, whether one believed Congress should be unicameral or
bicameral and whether one believed it should represent the states or the people
generally turned on how much power that person thought Congress should
have. Advocates of a weak Congress, such as the promoters of the New Jersey
Plan at the federal convention, tended to favor unicameralism and
representation by states. See James Madison, Journal (June 15, 1787),
reprinted in 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 242-45). Advocates of a
strong Congress, such as the promoters of the Virginia Plan, id. at 20-22 (May
29, 1787), virtually all favored bicameralism and some sort of "proportional"
representation-that is, representation by population, wealth, or financial
contribution. This coincidence was not an accident; it flowed from a shared
principle of political science: the more power a government has, the more firmly
it should rest on the people. Thus, a nationalist like Rufus King could describe
per capita state voting as a "vicious principle of representation," even when
limited to one house, id. at 490 (June 30, 1787), while Oliver Ellsworth, who
favored per capita representation in the Senate, complemented it with his
desire for more decentralization. Id. at 492. Similarly, the Bill of Rights was
adopted to please mostly those who advocated a weak federal system-the
conditional anti-federalists. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. The Bill
of Rights, of course, is mostly a list of things the federal government may not
do. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
53. For a copy of the Virginia Plan, see James Madison, Journal (May 29,
1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 20-22.
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gradually diluted the plan. The final version projected a
central government that, while a good deal stronger than
the Confederation Congress, was limited to defined and
enumerated powers. 4
When reported on September 17, 1787, the Constitution
was only a proposal, a sort of public offer. By the terms of
the offer, acceptance would require ratification by popular
conventions in nine of the thirteen states."
The offer was followed by a vigorous public debate over
whether to accept. Those favoring ratification called them-
selves "federalists," and they tagged their opponents as
"anti-federalists."6 The labels stuck. Opponents were them-
selves split into two major subgroups, which we may call
"unconditional anti-federalists" and "conditional anti-feder-
alists." The former opposed the Constitution under any
circumstances. The latter would agree to ratification if pro-
vided with certain safeguards." Most of these safeguards
involved assurances that the central government would be
weak enough to leave broad powers in the states and broad
rights with the people.
In December, 1787 and January, 1788 the federalist
faction won decisive victories in five states: Conventions in
Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and
Connecticut all ratified by wide margins. Among the re-
54. The course of this process is discussed in Natelson, Enumerated, supra note
2.
55. U.S. CONST. art. VII. Congress served only a transmittal role. The
Convention forwarded the document to Congress, which neither approved nor
disapproved it, but sent it on to the states.
56. None of the Well-Born Conspirators, PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., Apr. 23, 1788,
reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 203 (editorial
comment).
57. A letter from William Fleming contains an example of conditional anti-
federalist sentiment: "[Firom the above you will see that I am for the
Constitution with such amendments as will secure the liberty of the Subject."
Letter from William Fleming to Thomas Madison (Feb. 19, 1788), in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 141.
58. See the chronology at 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 19-25.
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maining states, only in Maryland59 were the proponents of
the Constitution so strong. To win in any of the other
remaining states, they needed to form a coalition with the
conditional anti-federalists. Accordingly, the federalists
issued reassuring representations as to the meaning of cer-
tain parts of the Constitution, ° such as the General Welfare
Clause, 1 that anti-federalists had found ambiguous or
threatening.2 In addition, the federalists entered into a
gentlemen's agreement with the conditional anti-federalists
to the effect that, once the Constitution was ratified, it
would be amended to scale back the prerogatives of the cen-
tral government. This gentlemen's agreement resulted in
the Bill of Rights.
The federalists' decision to compromise persuaded
enough conditional anti-federalists to obtain ratification in
the remaining states.63 Induced by the federalists' represen-
59. The Maryland convention ratified in April by a 63-11 margin, id. at 23,
and refused to propose amendments, Address to the People of Maryland (Apr.
20, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 548-49, 555. The rejected
amendments also are printed in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
240-41. They begin with the statement, "That it be declared that all Persons
entrusted with the Legislative or Executive Powers of Government, are the
Trustees and Servants of the Public, and as such accountable for their
Conduct."). Although not adopted by the Maryland convention, the proposed
amendments were reprinted all over America. Id. at 237-38.
60. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (Apr.
28, 1788), in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 233, 235 ("[T]here are
many things in the Constitution, which only need to be explained, in order to
prove equally satisfactory to all parties."). The content of some important
federalist representations are discussed in detail in Natelson, Enumerated,
supra note 2.
61. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States ....").
62. For example, in response to anti-federalist claims that the General
Welfare Clause could be interpreted to grant plenary power to Congress,
federalists responded that it was not a grant but a limitation of power.
Natelson, General Welfare, supra note 2, at 38-44.
63. Massachusetts may serve as an example. While the final vote at the
state ratifying convention was still undecided, Governor John Hancock, whose
previous stance on the Constitution had been unknown, offered a formula for
THE PUBLIC TRUST
tations and by the gentlemen's agreement, delegates in
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York
approved the document by narrow margins. South Carolina
approved by a somewhat wider margin.' North Carolina
and Rhode Island refused to ratify until the new federal
Congress actually had approved the Bill of Rights and sent
it to the states for ratification.65 Thus was the grand consti-
tutional bargain proposed, negotiated, and approved. The
surviving records of that process tell us much about the
values the Constitution embodied.66
IV. THE FOUNDERS' POLITICAL AND LEGAL CANON
A. Contents of the Canon
The participants in the constitutional debates were
great readers. Books were relatively scarce, however, so
they tended to read many of the same things. Surveying the
Founders' literary canon offers valuable insight into what
they thought-and why they thought as they did.
The starting point of the canon, of course, was the
Bible. Next came the classics of ancient Greece and Rome,
often perused in the original languages.67 The Founders also
studied more recent European philosophers, particularly
ratification that included recommended amendments. Samuel Adams, hitherto
an anti-federalist, then switched sides, assuring ratification by a 53%-47%
majority. Adams' decisive convention speech is located at 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 130-33.
64. The convention vote in Massachusetts was 187-168, in New Hampshire
57-47, in New York 30-27, in Virginia 89-79, and in South Carolina 149-73. All
of these states ratified only after proposing amendments. 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 23-24.
65. Both North Carolina and Rhode Island had effectively rejected the
Constitution previously. Subsequent ratification in Rhode Island was still close
(34-32). See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 19-25 for the ratification
chronology.
66. See infra Part V.
67. See generally RICHARD, supra note 2, at 12-38 (providing a general
overview of the education system in the founding generation).
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Niccolo Machiavelli 8 and Baron Montesquieu, 9 and read
widely among English political theorists of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. They did not much approve of thejustifications for royal power they found in the works of
King James I, Robert Filmer, or David Hume," but they
read with approbation English "country party"71 theorists
such as John Milton, James Harrington, Algernon Sidney,
John Locke, Henry St. James Bolingbroke, and Richard
Price. 2 They also perused popular law books featuring po-
68. I have not focused on Machiavelli in the pages that follow. However, his
Discourses on Livy occasionally use fiduciary language (most often "guardian" or
"guardianship") to describe public duties. See generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI,
DISCOURSES UPON THE FIRST TEN BOOKS OF TITUS LivY (attributed to Henry Neville
trans., 1675), available at http'/www.constitution.org/mac/dischvy_.htm (last
visited Dec. 10, 2004). For examples of citation of Machiavelli during the ratification
debates, see Centinel III, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 58; MERCY WARREN, A COLUMBIAN
PATRIOT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION (1788), reprinted in 16 id. at 282.
69. On Montesquieu's influence, see infra notes 247-254 and accompanying text.
70. See infra Part IV.C.
71. The term was used to refer to those who generally opposed the king's
pretensions, in opposition to the "court party." See, e.g., 5 HUME, supra note 2,
at 243; see also MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 59, who also uses the term "English
Opposition" to describe this group.
72. Thus, John Adams praised the "revolution principles" of "Aristotle and
Plato, of Livy and Cicero, and Sidney, Harrington, and Locke . . . ." JOHN
ADAMS, NOVANGLUS; OR, A HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE WITH AMERICA, FROM ITS
ORIGIN, IN 1754, TO THE PRESENT TIME, reprinted in ADAMS, WRITINGS, supra
note 2, at 147, 152. Hamilton's notes for his famous June 18, 1787 convention
speech contain the following reference: "Aristotle-Cicero Montesquieu-
Neckar." 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 308. Historian Carl J. Richard
tells us:
After the Stamp Act of 1765, many theses applied the political
principles of Aristotle, Cicero, and Polybius to the debates concerning
independence and the Constitution. Samuel Adams had anticipated
these issues in his own master's thesis, delivered in flawless Latin in
1743. In answer to the title question "Whether It Be Lawful to Resist
the Supreme Magistrate, if the Commonwealth Cannot Be Otherwise
Preserved," Adams resoundingly asserted: absolutely!
RICHARD, supra note 2, at 24.
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litical observations amid their legal expositions.73 Many of
these works, in one form or other, promoted elements of the
public trust doctrine.
B. The Classical Core: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero
Plato's most widely-read work, the Republic,74 outlined
an ideal state governed by philosopher-kings called
"guardians," a word carrying the same fiduciary implica-
tions to eighteenth century readers as it does to us today.5
According to Plato, the purpose of the state was to promote
the interest of the entire society,76 and the guardian was to
subordinate his interest to that purpose. The guardian
also had a duty of impartiality: "The object of our legisla-
tion," Plato wrote, "is not the welfare of any particular
class, but of the whole community."78 Moieover, Plato's
guardian had a certain duty of care, particularly the obliga-
tion to equip himself with the knowledge and education
necessary to make appropriate decisions; governmental
administration was an art that untrained people should not
attempt.79
Aristotle's Politics'6 was a survey and assessment of
existing and possible state constitutions. The Politics
73. Legal writers are discussed infra Part IV.E.1.
74. As a fixture in contemporary education, Plato was cited occasionally
during the public debate over ratification. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 49,
supra note 2, at 283 (Madison). For a critical citation, see Letter from Edmund
Pendleton to Nathaniel Pendleton, Jr. (Oct. 10, 1787) in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 357-58.
75. See infra Part IV.E.I.b.
76. PLATO, supra note 2, at 164.
77. Id. at 71.
78. Id. at 284-85.
79. See id. at 249-50.
80. In 1790, James Wilson quoted Hugo Grotius (about whom, see infra notes
112-117 and accompanying text), stating: "Among philosophers, Aristotle
deservedly holds the chief place." RICHARD, supra note 2, at 230. In 1783, when
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praised those constitutions that "aim at the common advan-
tage," as opposed to those "that aim at the rulers' own
advantage only."81 Aristotle's mentor Plato had introduced
the notion that there were three simple forms of govern-
ment; monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; and three
perversions thereof; tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule. 2
Aristotle modified this matrix slightly, and used a trust
principle to distinguish the simple forms from the perver-
sions: His first three forms-kingship, aristocracy, and
politeia (a democratic constitutional republic)-were ruled
for the common advantage.83 The three perversions-
tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy-were administered for
the advantage of the rulers. Thus, "tyranny is monarchy
ruling in the interest of the monarch, oligarchy government
in the interest of the rich, democracy government in the
interest of the poor, and none of these forms governs with
regard to the profit of the community."84
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics described the duty of
the civil magistrate as being the "guardian of the Just and
therefore of the Equal."5 Magistrates were expected to be
governed by the law.86 Because the magistrate was the
guardian of equality, he should proceed impartially. He
should, therefore, distribute benefits strictly in accordance
with legal justice, and should not seize a disproportionate
share of good things for himself-otherwise he would
become a tyrant.87 Thus, the sort of justice a magistrate
James Madison was a member of Congress and headed a committee charged with
recommending books for congressional use, he placed Aristotle's Politics at the top
of the list. RICHARD, supra note 2, at 140. Madison referred to Aristotle's political
philosophy, with attribution, in at least one later public paper. See id. at 156.
81. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 2, at 205.
82. See RICHARD, supra note 2, at 124.
83. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 2, at 207.
84. Id.
85. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 2, at 123.
86. See id. at 123.
87. See id.
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doled out to citizens was not the sort that a parent gave to
children, for children belonged to the parent, while citizens
were not the property of the magistrate.8
A special hero to many in the founding generation was
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.), the Roman republican
statesman, orator, and political philosopher.89 Most edu-
cated people had read his leading works, along with those of
other Romans, in Latin as well as in English.9 ° One of
Cicero's most admired tracts, de Officiis ("On Duties"),91
dealt at length with the standards appropriate for public
officials.
In his discussion of public duties in de Officiis, Cicero
took as a starting point the passages from Plato's Republic
discussed above. However, he altered their import slightly
in a way that a modern (or eighteenth century) reader
would recognize as more precisely fiduciary. Cicero, it may
be recalled, was a great lawyer and the Romans had well-
developed law governing agency and testamentary trusts.
The following passage demonstrates how Cicero's language
communicates, particularly to the reader of Latin, the
notion of fiduciary government. It is a translation of a por-
88. Id. at 124.
89. RICHARD, supra note 2, at 57 (listing Cato the Younger, Brutus, Cassius,
and Cicero as "[tihe founders' principal Roman heroes"). Cicero was a special
favorite of James Wilson, id. at 65, 175-77, and John Adams, id. at 61-63, 178.
Wilson's Works are replete with references to Cicero. See WILSON, supra note 2,
at 859 (index).
90. See, e.g., RICHARD, supra note 2, at 19. An example of Cicero's pervasive
influence on style and pattern of thought is the way the anti-federalist essayist
the "Impartial Examiner" introduced his subject: From the standpoint of a
foreigner looking in. Both the device and the style (notably of his fourth
sentence) are distinctly reminiscent of the introduction to Cicero's oration Pro
Caelio. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 387-88. Both passages are too
long to reproduce here.
91. Besides being influential among the learned, de Officiis was occasionally
cited in the newspapers during the ratification debates. See, e.g., A REVIEW OF
THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION BY A FEDERAL
REPUBLICAN (Oct. 28, 1787), reprinted in 3 STORING, supra note 2, at 65-66, 86
(an anti-federalist writer).
92. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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tion of de Officiis with the Roman fiduciary terms [in
brackets]:
For those who are to take charge of the affairs of government
should keep in mind two rules of Plato: first, to so exercise
guardianship [tueanturl of the good of the citizens that whatever
they do they focus on it, forgetful of their own interests; second,
that they care for [curent, a term used of agents and guardians]
the entire body of the state lest, while they guard [tuentur] some
part they desert the rest. For just like a guardianship [tutela], the
agency [procuratio] of the state must be carried on for the good of
those whose interest was entrusted [commissi, related to fidei
commissum, a testamentary trust], not for those to whom it was
entrusted [commissa]. Now, those who consult the interests of a
part of the citizens and neglect another part, introduce into the
state a most wicked element-sedition and party strife. 3
Note that amid the mass of fiduciary language were the
substantive assertions that a public official has the fiduci-
ary's duties of subordination of interest and of impartiality.
Other passages enjoined the magistrate to proceed in strict
accordance with justice and the rule of law, and to subordi-
nate his own interest to them. Thus, Cicero wrote, "[the
magistrate] will not expose anyone to hatred or disrepute by
groundless charges." On the contrary, "he will surely cleave
to justice and honour so closely that he will submit to any
loss, however heavy, rather than be untrue to them, and will
face death itself rather than renounce them."4 Further, "they
who administer the government should be like the laws,
93. CICERO, supra note 2, at 87. The translation of this particular passage is
mine, however, not Walter Miller's. The original is as follows:
Omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt duo Platonis praecepta
teneant: unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut, quaecumque
agunt, ad earn referant obliti commodorum suorum, alterum, ut totum
corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas
deserant. Ut enim tutela, sic procuratio rei publicae ad eorum
utilitatem, qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum, quibus commissa est,
gerenda est. Qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem
perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam.
See also id. at 89-91 (explaining that government ought not to be administered
for the personal satisfaction of the magistrates).
94. Id. at 89 (Walter Miller's translation).
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which are led to inflict punishment not by wrath but by jus-
tice,"95 for the fiduciary, like others involved in the transac-
tions of daily life, had the duty of good faith.96
Cicero added the following passage, in which I have
again flagged fiduciary terms [in brackets]:
It is, then, peculiarly the place of a magistrate to bear in mind
that he represents the state and that it is his duty to uphold its
honour and its dignity, to enforce the law [servare leges-more
literally, "to observe the laws"], to dispense to all their
constitutional rights, and to remember that all this has been
committed to him as a sacred trust [fidei suae commissa].
The private individual ought first, in private relations, to live on
fair and equal terms with his fellow-citizens, with a spirit neither
servile and groveling nor yet domineering; and second, in matters
pertaining to the state, to labour for her peace and honour; for
such a man we are accustomed to esteem and call a good citizen.97
C. The Bible: According to King James
In Britain the view that the Bible enjoins strict fiduci-
ary-style duties on rulers had been popularized, not by
opponents of the Crown, but by some of its staunchest de-
95. Id. at 91 (Walter Miller's translation).
96. See id. at 341 (Walter Miller's translation):
It was Quintus Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, who used to attach the
greatest importance to all questions of arbitration to which the formula
was appended "as good faith requires"; and he held that the expression
"good faith" had a very extensive application, for it was employed in
trusteeships and partnerships, in trusts and commissions, in buying
and selling, in hiring and letting-in a word, in all the transactions on
which the social relations of daily life depend ....
97. Id. at 126 (Walter Miller's translation). The original is as follows:
Est igitur proprium munus magistratus intellegere se gerere personam
civitatis debereque eius dignitatem et decus sustinere, servare leges,
iura discribere, ea fidei suae commissa meminisse. Privatum autem
oportet aequo et pari cum civibus iure vivere neque summissum et
abiectum neque se efferentem, tum in re publica ea velle, quae
tranquilla et honesta sint; talem enim solemus et sentire bonum civem
et dicere.
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fenders. The best-known of these was himself a king of
England. This was James Stuart, who served as James VI
of Scotland (from 1567, shortly after his first birthday, until
his death in 1625) and as James I of England (1603-1625)."8
King James is rightfully famous for commissioning
scholars to produce what became one of the finest literary
works in the English language: the King James Version of
the Bible. But James was somewhat of a scholar in his own
right. A few years before ascending the English throne, he
had propounded his view of kingship in several major publi-
cations, the most important of which was his essay, The
Trew Law of Free Monarchies.99 In view of James' identifica-
tion with the doctrine of divine right, one reading the Trew
Law may be surprised to see how rigorous were his
standards for royal conduct. James is considered an advo-
cate of divine right not because he thought the king was
free of rules, but only because of how he thought the rules
should be enforced: by the final judgment of God rather
than by rebellious subjects. He may have absorbed the lat-
ter idea from the pronouncements of his English predeces-
sor, Queen Elizabeth."'
James' thesis was that a king occupied a position vis-A-
vis his subjects analogous to that of a father over his chil-
98. A very useful, if somewhat enthusiastic, Web portal devoted to James is
available at http://www.jesus-is-lord.com/kinginde.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
99. JAMES STUART, supra note 2.
100. In 1567, James' mother, Mary Queen of Scots, had been accused of
forming a conspiracy with the Earl of Bothwel whereby she promised to marry
him after they arranged the murder of her husband. After her husband was
killed and she had married Bothwel, her subjects rose in revolt. Through an
ambassador, Queen Elizabeth exhorted the Scots to restore Mary to the throne,
stating that:
[Ilt belonged not to them to reform, much less to punish, the mal-
administration of their prince; and the only arms, which subjects could
in any case lawfully employ against the supreme authority, were
entreaties, counsels, and representations: That if these expedients
failed, they were next to appeal by their prayers to Heaven; and wait
with patience till the Almighty, in whose hands are the hearts of
princes, should be pleased to turn them to justice and to mercy.
4 HUME, supra note 2, at 97-98.
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dren.'0 A father's moral obligation was an exacting one, but
a father's violation of that obligation did not give his children
a right to kill or rebel against him. Judgment on a trespass-
ing father (or king) would be imposed by the hand of God. 102
James' argument relied heavily on biblical analysis. In
a single two-page passage in the Trew Law, for example,
James cited the first and second Books of Kings, the second
Book of Chronicles, the first Book of Samuel, Romans,
Jeremiah, and Psalms, as well as other passages. °3 James
deduced from the Bible that a sovereign had the duty to
dispense justice to the people, establish and enforce laws
that benefited the people rather than the sovereign, enforce
the state religion, and defend the nation from foreign ene-
mies.0 4 The sovereign likewise should refrain from using his
power for private purposes at the expense of his subjects.
James said a king who violated this maxim was a tyrant.
10 5
Finally, the sovereign should follow the law: "a good king
will not only delight to rule his subjects by the law but even
will conform himself [to it] in his own actions."' '
In summary, James argued that the Bible mandated
that the monarch act
as a loving father and careful watchman, caring for [his subjects]
more than for himself, knowing himself to be ordained for them
and they not for him, and therefore countable to that great God
who placed him as his lieutenant over them upon the peril of his
soul to procure the weal [welfare] of both souls and bodies, as far
as in him lieth, all of them that are committed to his charge. °7
101. JAMES STUART, supra note 2, at 73-74.
102. See id. at 66.
103. Id. at 55-56.
104. See id; see also the same author's Basilikon Doron in JAMES STUART,
supra note 2 at 85 ("Kingly Gift," an essay about royal power and obligations
written for his son and heir apparent).
105. JAMES STUART, supra note 2, at 62.
106. Id. at 72.
107. Id. at 56-57.
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James' ill-fated1.8 son and successor, Charles I, seems to
have inherited a similar view of kingship. In a letter
addressed to his own son (later Charles II), the king wrote, "I
had rather You should be Charls le Bon, than le Grand,
Good, than Great... and dispose You to those Princely
endowments and employments, which will most gain the
love and intend the welfare of those, over whom God shall
place you."1 °9 Charles further admonished the heir apparent
to protect the established church, keep the public peace, fol-
low the law (while sometimes mitigating its rigor), and pur-
sue the good of the community by remaining impartial and
above faction."' On another occasion, Charles explicitly
employed fiduciary language, speaking of the "legal trust"
imposed by law on the Crown to remove Catholics from the
royal court.'
In 1625, the year of James' death, the great Dutch jurist
Hugo Grotius published De Jure Belli et Pacis. 2 Although
his monarchical sentiments cannot have been popular with
the Founders, De Jure became part of their legal canon.1
108. He was beheaded by rebellious subjects in 1649.
109. CHARLES STUART, supra note 2, at 210-11.
110. Id. at 211 (maintaining "Gods [sic] glory," the church, and public
peace); id at 215 (governing in accordance with law, using prerogative to
mitigate its rigor); id at 216 (remaining above faction for the good of the
community); id at 217 (remaining impartial).
111. Speech to the Lords and Commons, Apr. 28, 1641 in CHARLES STUART,
supra note 2, at 9. See also infra note 130 and accompanying text.
112. GROTIUS, supra note 2. The title sometimes is rendered, "De Jure Belli
ac Pacis," using an alternative Latin word for "and."
113. The contestants in the constitutional debate occasionally relied on
Grotius, but not, of course, for his royalism. Thus, on the federalist side, he was
quoted by Madison and Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST No. 20, supra note 2 (James
Madison & Alexander Hamilton), at 103; id. No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) at
485; and on the anti-federalist side, by "Brutus." See Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31,
1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY'HISTORY, supra note 2, at 512, 514. In 1760,
the young John Adams recorded a number of legal works he had read, but
regretted that he had yet to "read any part of the best authors, Pufendorf and
Grotius." WARREN, supra note 2, at 172. By 1774, Adams had repaired this
defect, for he cited both in his Novanglus. ADAMS, WRITINGS, supra note 2, at
204, 206 (citing Grotius); id. at 208 (relying on Pufendorf). In his 1790 lectures
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Like James and Charles, Grotius took the position that the
king was not accountable to the people for his actions. He
conceded that "in most governments, the good of the gov-
erned is the object."114 Further, he accepted the fiduciary
model of government, using the Roman law terms for
"guardianship," "guardian," and "ward." However, he turned
that model against those who argued that kings should be
accountable to their subjects:
But it does not follow, as our opponents infer, that peoples are
superior to kings: for guardianship [tutela, the Roman law
equivalent] is for the sake of the ward [pupilli causal, and yet the
guardian has authority over the ward. And we are not to allow
them to urge that if a guardian [tutorem] neglects his duty to the
ward, he may be superseded; and that therefore kings may be so.
For this is the case with a guardian, because he has a superior,
(the State); but in political government, because he cannot have
an infinite gradation of superiors, we must stop as some person or
body, whose transgressions, having no superior judge, are the
province of God ....
Nevertheless, Grotius did concede some areas of official
accountability:
[F]or he who has to appoint a magistrate is bound to the republic
to elect one who is worthy; and the republic has a right to demand
this: and therefore, if by an unworthy election he has produced
damage to the republic, he is bound to make it good.1
7
on law, James Wilson repeatedly cited Grotius. 1 WILSON, supra note 2, at 80,
107, 110, 111, 149-50, 151, 192.
114. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 124-25.
115. Regarding the phrase "For this is the case with a guardian, because he
has a superior, (the State)," the original text says merely, "Nam in tutore hoc
procedit, qui superiorem habet." Id.
116. Id.
117. 2 id. at 190. In an older, unattributed English translation of this work
currently available at http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Thebes/8098 (last visited
Sept. 7, 2004), the following words appear: "[K]ingdoms are not so much a
patrimony, which may be alienated at pleasure, as a trust, placed in the hands
of the sovereign for the benefit of his people." However, the original, located in
Book 3, Chapter 20 § 5, does not support that translation. It actually reads,
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Robert Filmer's 1680 book, the Patriarcha, was the most
important statement of the royalist position in its time. In
the Patriarcha, Filmer elaborated on James' contentions,
including the father-child analogy" 8 and the fiduciary norms
honored by the virtuous king." Filmer made even more ex-
tensive use of the Bible than James.2 ° Members of the
founding generation who had not read Filmer directly be-
came familiar with his arguments through the popular
rebuttal by Algernon Sidney.
"regnum habentes non in patrimonio sed tanquam in usufructu, paciscendo
alienare non valent." 3 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 324. The meaning is, "those
holding a kingdom [do so] not as a patrimony but as a life estate [in usufructu],
and they do not have the power to transfer it by treaty" (my translation).
118. FILMER, supra note 2:
The father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will, not
by the laws and wills of his sons or servants. There is no nation that
allows children any action or remedy for being unjustly governed; and
yet, for all this, every father is bound by the law of nature to do his best
for the preservation of his family. But much more is a king always tied
by the same law of nature to keep this general ground, that the safety of
the kingdom be his chief law; he must remember that the profit of every
man in particular, and of all together in general, is not always one and
the same; and that the public is to be preferred before the private ....
119. FILMER, supra note 2:
Now albeit kings who make the laws be, as King James teacheth us,
above the laws, yet will they rule their subjects by the law . . . . And
although a king do frame all his actions to be according to the laws, yet
he is not bound thereto but at his good will and for good example, or so
far forth as the general law of the safety of the commonweal doth
naturally bind him .... By this means are all kings, even tyrants and
conquerors, bound to preserve the lands, goods, liberties, and lives of
all their subjects, not by any municipal law of the land so much as the
natural law of a father, which binds them to ratify the acts of their
forefathers and predecessors in things necessary for the public good of
their subjects.
120. For example, in the first chapter of the Patriarcha alone, Filmer cited
the stories of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Moses, and Joshua,
among others. See id.
121. See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
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Two royalists more respected than James or Filmer were
David Hume 12 2 and Sir Francis Bacon.123 Both promoted the
notion that the king had fiduciary-style obligations. Hume's
History of England (final lifetime edition: 1778) repeatedly
referred to public service in fiduciary terms."' Bacon had
122. For a favorable reference to Hume during the ratification controversy,
see Nicholas Collin, A Foreign Spectator: An Essay on the Means of Promoting
Federal Sentiments in the United States I, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Aug 6,
1787, reprinted in FRIENDS, supra note 2, at 406, 426. During the founding era,
Hume seems to have been universally classed as a royalist, but his work was
one of only a handful that John Adams requested his wife Abigail to send to him
while he was in New York. See Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (May
24, 1789), in Adams Family Papers, available at http://www.masshist.org/
digitaladams/aea/cfm/doc.cfm?id=L17890524ja (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
Having plowed through all six volumes of Hume's History (an exercise not at
all displeasing), I found his royalism rather tepid. He was a strong advocate of
the limitations imposed on the monarchy by the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688.
See 6 HUME, supra note 2, at 496-520. Where he seems to have departed most
significantly from country party doctrine is in his conclusion that the
limitations imposed on the Crown after the reign of Elizabeth were not
expressions of ancient Anglo-Saxon liberties, but desirable innovations. See,
e.g., id. at 531-34. This theme runs through the last three volumes of his work.
Typical of his approach is the discussion of James II's use of the dispensing
power, the king's prerogative to refuse to enforce inconvenient legislation. Id. at
472-76.
123. John Dickinson once described Bacon as "the greatest man that ever
livd" [sic]. H. Trevor Colbourn, A Pennsylvania Farmer at the Court of King
George: John Dickinson's London Letters, 1754-1756, 86 PA. MAG. OF HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 241, 280 (1962). James Wilson referred to him as "the profound and
penetrating Bacon." WILSON, supra note 2, at 149.
124. E.g., 2 HUME, supra note 2, at 41 (referring to the "breach of trust" of
the official "Committee of 24 Barons" in 1261); 3 id. at 446 (paraphrasing
favorably the advice of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V to his son, Philip II
of Spain, that "the great and only duty of a prince [is] the study of his people's
happiness" and "the sole end of government, the felicity of the nations
committed to [the ruler's] care"); 4 id. at 177 (referring to officeholders "who
received trust or emolument from the public"); id. at 374 (referring to "the trust
committed to" members of Parliament); 5 id. at 245 (referring to judges as
"guardians of law and liberty," and suggesting that in the case discussed, they
breached their duty); id. at 355 (referring to members of Parliament as
"guardians to the laws"); 6 id. at 237 (referring to the king's financial trust). See
also infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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recommended that kings remain impartial toward the coun-
try's various "factions" (special interests):
The motions of factions under the King ought to be like the
motions (as the astronomers speak) of the inferior orbs, which may
have their proper motions [i.e., their own motions], but yet still are
quietly carried by the higher motion of "primum mobile."
125
D. English Puritan and "Country Party" Figures
When even the firmest advocates of royal prerogative
acknowledged that rulers ought to act as fiduciaries, it is not
surprising that those who challenged royal power would
agree. Writing in the eighteenth century, Hume credited the
origins of then-current ideas of liberty to the English Puri-
tans. 26 This was a group among which fiduciary language
was prominent in political discourse. For example, Hume
dated modern notions of Parliamentary freedom from Febru-
ary 9, 1576, during the reign of Elizabeth I. The occasion was
a speech on the floor by Peter Wentworth, a Puritan member
of the House of Commons. As reported by Hume,
Wentworth's oration sounded themes that later became all-
125. BACON, suprd note 2, at 271. Note that Bacon carefully avoided the
then-contentious issue of which orbs circled which. This was not the only time
Bacon used the planetary simile. See id. at 115. Primum mobile means "first
mover," that is, the impetus for the system. Readers familiar with the
proceedings of the federal constitutional convention may recall that John
Dickinson borrowed this solar system simile to describe the proposed
relationship between the central government and the states. See James
Madison, Journal (June 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note
2, at 152-53.
126. 4 HUME, supra note 2, at 145-46:
So absolute, indeed, was the authority of the crown [under Elizabeth I],
that the precious spark of liberty had been kindled, and was preserved,
by the puritans alone; and it was to this sect, whose principles appear
so frivolous and habits so ridiculous, that the English owe the whole
freedom of the constitution.
See also id. at 368 ("[Tlhe noble principles of liberty took root, and spreading
themselves, under the shelter of puritanical absurdities, became fashionable
among the people.").
1108 [Vol. 52
THE PUBLIC TRUST
important: the inestimable value of liberty, the need for free-
dom of speech in Parliament, the dignity of Parliament as a
partner with the Crown, and the following fiduciary lan-
guage:
That as the parliament was the great guardian of the laws, they
ought to have liberty to discharge their trust, and to maintain that
authority, whence even kings themselves derive their being: That
a king was constituted such by law, and though he was not
dependant [sic] on man, yet he was subordinate to God and the
law, and was obliged to make their prescriptions, not his own will,
the rule of his conduct .... 127
For his temerity Elizabeth committed Wentworth to
prison, but released him a month later, by "her special grace
and favour."
121
During the following century, the Puritans made a bid
for supreme power, attaining it with the beheading of
Charles I in 1649. During the struggle leading up to that
moment, Oliver Cromwell, then the chief power in the army,
issued a remonstrance to Parliament in which he reminded
the legislature that they were but "servants and trustees of
the people."'29 During the trial of Charles I the Puritan
prosecution asserted that as a king, Charles was a trustee-
a claim the king admitted.
1 30
In 1648, the Puritan poet and polemicist John Milton
published The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates."' This tract
127. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 180.
129. 5 id. at 529.
130. Id. at 535-56.
131. JOHN MILTON, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, in MILTON, supra
note 2 at 52. Milton was occasionally cited in the public debate on the
Constitution. See, e.g., Cincinnatus II, N.Y. J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 11 (an antifederalist); The Landholder
XI, CONN. COURANT, Mar. 17, 1788, reprinted in 16 id. at 405 ("A Landholder"
was Oliver Ellsworth, a national convention delegate and federalist, citing an
episode from Paradise Lost); see also BAILYN, supra note 2, at 39 (speaking of
"inheritors of seventeenth-century libertarianism.., descending from Milton
and Harrington through Neville, Sidney, and Locke").
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relied on Aristotle's Politics and many other sources, but
most extensively on the Bible, to demonstrate (according to
the subtitle) "[tihat it is Lawfull, and hath been held so
through all Ages, for any, who have the Power, to call to
account a Tyrant, or wicked King." Milton argued that public
officers were the "Deputies and Commissioners" of the people
who were "intrusted" with the task of furthering common
justice.32 A king or magistrate was subject to the law, and
also subject to discipline if he "prov'd unfaithfull to his
trust."133 Like a trustee, a king had an obligation to rule for
the good of his charges and to be impartial among factions;
otherwise, he was a tyrant."M
In both his Tenure of Kings and Magistrates and his
sequel, the Defence of the People of England,3 ' Milton relied
on the example set by the Roman Emperor Trajan, perhaps
the exemplar of the fiduciary-style ruler. 36 Milton at least
three times referred to an old story in which Trajan was said
to have presented his praetorian prefect with a sword, along
with the comment, "To you I commit this [sword] as a protec-
tion for me if I do good; but if [I do] otherwise, then against
me""37-the point being, of course, that a ruler was responsi-
ble to his subjects for any abuse of authority. Moreover,
Milton noted that when the Scots had established the infant
132. MILTON, supra note 131, at 60 ("It being thus manifest that the power of
Kings and Magistrates is nothing else, but what is only derivative, transferr'd and
committed to them in trust from the People, to the Common good of them all .... ").
133. Id. at 59-60; JOHN MILTON, Defence of the People of England, in
MILTON, supra note 2, at 99, 128-29, 254-55.
134. MILTON, Defence of the People of England, in MILTON, supra note 2, at
66.
135. Id. at 99.
136. For the principles of Trajan's government, see generally Natelson, The
Government as Fiduciary, supra note 2.
137. "Tibi istum ad munimentum mei committo, si recte agam; sin aliter in
me magis." The story is told in SEXTUs AURELIUS VICTOR, BRIEF IMPERIAL LIVES,
at 139 (a fourth-century book of short imperial biographies, in Latin). Milton
refers to it in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, supra note 131, at 62, 75,
and in Defence of the People of England, supra note 133, at 243-44 (The
translation in the text of Trajan's comment is mine).
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James VI [James I of England] on their throne, they struck
on their coins the phrase, "Pro me; si merear, in me" (for me;
if I deserve it, against me). 13 8
Three years later, the Puritans drafted their Instrument
of Government-the first constitution for their kingless re-
public. The document included several references to the trust
duties of officials.139 Their second constitution, the Humble
Petition and Advice, contains similar references, including
the specific phrase, "public trust."'4
In 1656, with England still under Puritan control, James
Harrington published his Commonwealth of Oceana, a work
that proved particularly influential during the American
founding era." Harrington argued that it was not sufficient
for kings to be accountable only to God. "As an estate in trust
becomes a man's own if he be not answerable for it, so the
power of a magistracy not accountable to the people, from
138. See MILTON, supra note 2, at 75.
139. The "Instrument of Government" is available at http://www.fordham.
edu/halsall/mod/1653intrumentgovt.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2004). Relevant
references include Article XXV:
And in case of corruption, or other miscarriage in any of the Council in
their trust... and, in the interval of Parliaments, the major part of the
Council, with the consent of the Lord Protector, may, for corruption or
other miscarriage as aforesaid, suspend any of their number from the
exercise of their trust ....
and Article XLII: "That each person of the Council shall, before they enter upon
their trust, take and subscribe an oath, that they will be true and faithful in
their trust." Id.
140. See http://www.constitution.orgleng/conpurl02.htm (last visited Dec.
10, 2004). Relevant portions include, inter alia, Article 11 ("civil trust") and
Article 13 ("office or place of public trust").
141. For references to Harrington during the constitutional debates, see, for
example, COLLIN, supra note 122, at 426; Edmund Pendleton, Virginia
Convention (June 12, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 294. For a
critical citation from Pendleton, see Letter from Edmund Pendleton to
Nathaniel Pendleton, Jr., supra note 74, at 358. Benjamin Rush used
"Harrington" as his pseudonym in a federalist essay. See Benjamin Rush,
Harrington, PA. GAZETTE, May 30, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 116.
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whom it was received, becoming of private use, the com-
monwealth loses her liberty."''
The monarchy was restored in 1660. Yet the influence of
the public trust doctrine persisted-and was transported to
America. In 1662, Charles II granted a royal charter to the
"Governor and Company of the English colony of Connecticut
in New-England, in America." The charter specified that the
grant was "upon Trust, and for the Use and Benefit of Them-
selves and their Associates, Freemen of the said Colony,
their Heirs and Assigns"-that is, the governor and company
were to serve as the trustees not only for their present asso-
ciates, but for the colony's future free inhabitants.' The
charter issued the next year for Rhode Island also featured
public trust language, as did the 1732 charter for
Georgia.'
During the century following the Restoration, politically
active Englishmen tended to divide into advocates and oppo-
nents of royal power. The supporters of the sovereign came
to be known as the "court party," the opponents as the "coun-
142. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA 171 (J.G.A.
Pocock ed., 1992) [hereinafter HARRINGTON], available at http://www.
constitution.org/jh/oceana.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
143. See CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT (1662), available at http://www.nhinet.
org/ccs/docs/connl662.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004). The earlier charters of
Virginia and Massachusetts contain no such trust language. See FIRST CHARTER
OF VIRGINIA (Apr. 6, 1606), available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/va-l.htm;
SECOND CHARTER OF VIRGINIA (May 23, 1609), available at http://www.nhi-net.
org/ccs/docs/va-2.htm; THIRD CHARTER OF VIRGINIA (Mar. 12, 1612), available at
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/va-3.htm; FIRST CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS
(Mar. 4, 1629), available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/mass-l.htm (all sites
last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
144. CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663),
available at http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalon/states/ri04.htm (last visited
Dec. 10, 2004) ("Into the sayd Governour and Companv, and their successours,
forever, vpon trust, for the vse and benefit of themselves and their associates,
ffreemen of the sayd Collony").
145. GA. CHARTER passim (1732), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/states/ga0l.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
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try party.''146 These usually are thought of, respectively, as
the forerunners of the Tory and Whig parties. 0' However,
the coincidence was by no means perfect. Thus, during the
long Whig administration of Robert Walpole (1721-42), 141
avowed Tories, notably Henry St. John Bolingbroke,
assumed a country party stance."" In any event, the Ameri-
can founding generation borrowed heavily from country
party theorists (whatever their formal party affiliations) in
constructing their own political philosophy.'
Country party polemics included a healthy dose of public
trust doctrine. The earliest writer of this character, in
composition if not in publication date, was Algernon Sidney,
a transitional figure between Puritan republic and Restora-
tion era.'5' Sidney's principal work, the "Discourses
Concerning Government" was presented as a rebuttal to
146. For a discussion of these terms, see 6 HUME, supra note 2, at 307-08.
For a general use of them, see 5 id. at 243 (country party) and 6 id. at 248, 276,
293, 296, 365, 379; see also BAILYN, supra note 2, at 35-36, 43-44.
147. 6 HUME, supra note 2, at 381, 387.
148. BAILYN, supra note 2, at 395-36. For a brief biography of Walpole, see
Sir Robert Walpole, 1721-42, Whig, 10 DOWNING STREET, available at http:ll
www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Pagel74.asp (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
149. See Henry St. John Bolingbroke (1678-1751), in THE INTERNET
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/b/
bolingbr.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
150. See, e.g., infra notes 151, 157, 169, 180, 189, 193 and accompanying
text, describing founding-era citation to the writers named.
151. For a brief biography of Sidney, see R.W. DYSON, DICTIONARY OF
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH PHILOSOPHERS (2000), available at http://www.
thoemmes.com/dictionaries/sidney.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004). On his
influence on the founding generation, see BAILYN, supra note 2, at 39, 143-44,
148-49. For an example of a federalist citing him during the ratification debate,
see Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Convention (June 12, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 294. For examples of anti-federalists citing him, see
John DeWitt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts V,
AM. HERALD (Boston), Oct.-Dec. 1787, reprinted in 4 STORING, supra note 2, at
37; Cincinnatus II, supra note 131, at 11; Cato V, N.Y. J., Nov. 22, 1787,
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 184; Tamony, To the
Freeholders of America, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 9, 1788, reprinted in 15 id. at
324.
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Filmer. This work described government in general as a
trust,15 2 and identified specific standards thereby imposed on
government officials. Among those standards were honoring
the rules imposed by law, 53 subordinating one's own interest
to the public good," not converting public resources to one's155- "156
own benefit,5 and selecting competent agents.
152. E.g., SIDNEY, supra note 2, at 21 ("But in plain English, the
inconvenience with which such as he endeavour to affright us, is no more than
that he or they, to whom the power is given, may be restrained or chastised, if
they betray their trust"); id. at 257 ("any offices of trust, honour or profit"); id.
at 475 ("If [a king] fail of this, he performs not his trust"); id. at 483 ("he had
broken the trust reposed in him").
See also id. at 530-31:
But it not being reasonable that everyone should in this case do what
he pleased, it was thought fit that the king with his council (which
always consisted of the proceres and magnates regni) should judge what
numbers of men, and what places deserved to be made corporations or
bodies politick, and to enjoy those privileges, by which he did not confer
upon them anything that was his, but according to the trust reposed in
him .... for the publick good. This indeed increases the honor of the
person entrusted, and adds weight to the obligation incumbent upon
him; but can never change the nature of the thing, so as to make that
an inherent, which is only a delegated power. And as parliaments,
when occasion required, have been assembled, have refus'd to be
dissolved till their work was finished, have severely punished those
who went about to persuade kings, that such matters depended
absolutely upon their will, and made laws to the contrary: 'tis not to be
imagined, that they would not also have interposed their authority in
matters of charters, if it had been observed that any king had
notoriously abused the trust reposed in him, and turned the power to
his private advantage, with which he was entrusted for the publick
good.
153. Id. at 113.
154. Id. at 791 ("Government is instituted for the good of society. A lawful
king seeks the common good, and governing is not an advantage to the
governors, but a burden.").
155. Id. at 185.
156. Id. at 466 (judges must be learned and competent).
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John Locke's hugely influential" ' Second Treatise on
Civil Government examined at length the implications of
public trust doctrine. 158 Like Milton, Harrington, and Sidney,
Locke maintained that officials must act consistently with
the purposes of the governmental trust: the good of the
people and the security of their persons, liberty, and prop-
erty.'59 Locke (as did Francis Hutcheson after him) added
that when officials violate those purposes of government,
their authority-like the authority of private trustees in
analogous circumstances-is subject to forfeiture.'6 ° Hence,
157. Locke was repeatedly cited during the constitutional debates. See, e.g.,
James Madison, Journal (June 27, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND, RECORDS,
supra note 2, at 437-38 (Luther Martin, speaking at the federal, convention);
John DeWitt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(1787), reprinted in 4 STORING, supra note 2, at 37 (an antifederalist author);
Cato III, N.Y. J., Oct. 25, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 473 ("Cato," an anti-federalist author, was likely Governor George
Clinton of New York); Cincinnatus II, supra note 131, at 11 (an anti-federalist);
Tamony, supra note 151, at 324 (an anti-federalist author); Benjamin Rush,
CHARLESTON COLUMBIAN HERALD (Apr. 14, 1787), reprinted in 17 id. at 97 (a
federalist author); Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Convention (June 12, 1788), in
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 294 (a federalist).
James Wilson's repeated references to Locke in his own works are
referenced in 2 WILSON, supra note 2, at 866 (index).
158. LOCKE, supra note 2, passim; id. at 18 ("nor under the dominion of any
will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact according to
the trust put in it"); id. at 110 ("to the legislative, acting pursuant to their
trust"); id. at 113-14 ("the community put the legislative power into such hands
as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws,
or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty as it
was in the state of nature"); id. at 116-17 ("But government, into whosesoever
hands it is put, being, as I have before shown, entrusted with this condition,
and for this end, that men might have and secure their properties"); id. at 129
("The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed in the
executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it, but is a fiduciary trust
placed in him for the safety of the people.").
159. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 144-45; see also id. at 118-19.
160. Id. at 183-84 ("There is, therefore, secondly another way whereby
governments are dissolved, and that is when the legislative or the prince, either
of them, act contrary to their trust. First, The legislative acts against the trust
reposed in them when they endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and
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the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends,
there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter
the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust
reposed in them; for all power given with trust for the attaining an
end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly
neglected or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited. 161
Executive officers were also trustees: "The power of
assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed in the
executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it, but is
a fiduciary trust placed in him for the safety of the people
,,16 It was a breach of that trust for the executive to
"corrupt" lawmakers-that is, to create conditions of fear or
dependency that might cause them to commit their votes
before the debate over an issue has commenced. The reason
was that a "corrupt" legislator-like any agent with interests
different from those of the principal-easily can forget his
duty to follow the rules of the trust and his obligations of
loyalty, care, and impartiality.
163
to make themselves or any part of the community, masters or arbitrary
disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.").
For Hutcheson's less-developed views on public trust, see FRANCIS
HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY AND VIRTUE
IN TWO TREATISES 192-93 (Wolfgang Leidhold ed., 2004) (1725).
161. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 149.
162. Id. at 129; see also id. at 136 (executive is a trustee in use of the
prerogative); id. at 185 (executive's trust duty not to corrupt the legislature).
163. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 185-86. I find this to be a particularly
interesting and timely passage in these days of the pork-barrel broker-state:
What I have said here concerning the legislative in general, holds true
also concerning the supreme executor .... He acts also contrary to his
trust when he either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the
society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes;
or openly pre-engages the electors, and prescribes to their choice such
whom he has by solicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise won to
his designs, and employs them to bring in such, who have promised
beforehand what to vote and what to enact .... For the people having
reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives as the fence
to their properties, could do it for no other end but that they might
always be freely chosen, and, so chosen, freely act and advise as the
necessity of the commonwealth and the public good should, upon
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According to Locke, public officials should not engage
self-dealing:
[G]overnment... being... entrusted with this condition, and for
this end, that men might have and secure their properties, the
prince, or senate, however it may have power to make laws for the
regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another,
yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any
part of the subject's property, without their own consent. For this
would be in effect to leave them no property at all."
Moreover, Locke held that public officials must treat
beneficiaries (citizens and interest groups) impartially. Offi-
cials "are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to
be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich
and poor, for the favourite at court, and the countryman at
plough."165 Legislators were not permitted to delegate their
discretion."'
Locke agreed with other country party writers thatjudgment for a breach of fiduciary duty must come from the
people-divine disapproval was not sufficient:
Here, it is likely, the common question will be made: Who shall bejudge whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their
trust?... To this I reply: The people shall be judge; for who shall
be judge whether the trustee or deputy acts well and according to
the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and must, by
having deputed him, have still the power to discard him when he
examination and mature debate be judged to require. This those who
give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the
reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an
assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his
own will for the true representatives of the people and the law-makers
of the society, is certainly as great a breach of trust ....
Cf Natelson, Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at 382-407 (discussing
the Founders' ideal of independent citizens and decision makers, including the
independence of branches of government from each other).
164. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 116-17.
165. Id. at 119.
166. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 119; cf. 3 HUME, supra note 2, at 338 (implicit
in faith reposed in a trustee is assumption that discretion not be delegated).
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fails in his trust? If this be reasonable in particular cases of
private men, why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest
moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned, and also
where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redress very
difficult, dear, and dangerous' 6 7
Note also the final point: If strict rules of conduct are
important in a private context, then they are even more im-
portant "where the welfare of millions is concerned," "the
evil.., is greater" and the remedy "very difficult, dear, and
dangerous." As suggested earlier,'8 this view is consistent
with the pattern of private fiduciary law.
In the early 1720s, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon
published "Cato's Letters," a series of essays provoked by
government policies leading to the speculative South Sea
Bubble.'69  Relying explicitly on Aristotle's Nicomedian
Ethics,"' "Cato" wrote that, "Power in a free state, is a trust
committed by all to one or a few, to watch for the security,
and pursue the interest, of all,"'7' and that "Men who have a
trust frankly bestowed upon them by the people, to fre-
quently betray that trust, become conspirators against their
benefactors, and turn the sword upon those who gave it;
insomuch that in the greatest part of the earth, people are
happy if they can defend themselves against their defend-
ers. Like Locke, 73 Trenchard and Gordon argued that
167. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 203-04.
168. Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary, supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
169. On the influence of Cato's Letters on the Founding, see BAILYN, supra
note 2, at 40-44, 55.
170. 2 CATO'S LETTERS, supra note 2, at 558.
171. 1 id. at 179; see also id. at 111 ("The administration of government is
nothing else, but the attendance of the trustees of the people upon the interest
and affairs of the people"); ROBBINS, supra note 2, at 118 (saying of "Cato's"
views that "Government was a trust committed by all, or nearly all, to one or a
few who ought be bounded by restraints.").
172. 1 CATO'S LETTERS, supra note 2, at 179; see also id. at 142 (stating that
breaches of public trust should be punished with severity).
173. LOCKE, supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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breaches of public trust were greater than merely private
breaches.174 From this it followed that the standards imposed
on public trustees ought to be high:
[Government] is therefore a trust, which ought to be bounded with
many and strong restraints, because power renders men wanton,
insolent to others, and fond of themselves. Every violation
therefore of this trust, where such violation is considerable, ought
to meet with proportionable punishment; and the smallest
violation of it ought to meet with some, because indulgence to the
least faults of magistrates may be cruelty to a whole people. 7 '
Trenchard and Gordon considered it a breach of trust to
trammel freedom of speech, 7 ' to divert public resources to
private purposes,1 7 or not to follow the law and other "fixed
and stated rules. 17'  Executing the public trust did not
require a superman: "Honesty, diligence, and plain sense,
are the only talents necessary for the executing of this trust;
and the public good is its only end.'
71 9
Henry St. John Bolingbroke (1678-1751)1 0 wrote the
influential Dissertation Upon Parties, another composition
174. 1 CATO'S LETTERS, supra note 2, at 141.
175. Id. at 267; see also 2 id. at 550-51.
176. 1 id. at 110.
177. Id. at 76.
178. 1 id. at 186.
179. 1 id. at 267.
180. On Bolingbroke's influence in the founding generation, see BAILYN,
supra note 2, at 39-40, 45-48, 55.
In his famous sketches of other delegates at the national convention,
William Pierce he wrote of Alexander Hamilton that, "His language is not
always equal, sometimes didactic like Bolingbroke's at others light and tripping
like Stem's." William Pierce, Character Sketches of Delegates to the Federal
Convention (1787), reprinted in 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 89. See
also H. Trevor Colbourn (ed.), A Pennsylvania Farmer at the Court of King
George: John Dickinson's London Letters, 1754-1756, 86 PA. MAG. OF HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 419, 449 (1962) (John Dickinson's knowledge of, and appreciation
for, Bolingbroke); 1 WILSON, supra note 2, at 90-91, 195, 309, 317 n.g. (James
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relying on the public trust doctrine.' Bolingbroke listed four
principal duties arising from the trust reposed in the King
and in members of parliament: The first two were to pre-
serve liberty8 and to preserve the Constitution 83 -obliga-
tions analogous to the duty of the private trustee to follow
the instructions set forth in the trust instrument. The third
principal duty was to prevent the sort of "corruption" of the
legislature by the executive against which John Locke had
inveighed." The fourth was the obligation to exercise care-
that is, to administer the government competently. 8
5
Bolingbroke observed that to a certain extent the British
constitution provided correctives for breaches of trust, such
as Parliament's power to check the king' and the people's
power to check Parliament through frequent elections.
187
A later work of the same genre was James Burgh's
Political Disquisitions (1774),188 another favorite of the
founding generation. 9 Burgh focused on the trust duty9 ° of
Wilson's mostly appreciative comments on Bolingbroke in the course of his 1790
lectures).
181. E.g., BOLINGBROKE, supra note 2, at 45-46, 95, 100-02, 106-07, 117-18, 158.
182. E.g., id. at 101.
183. E.g., 2 id. at 95.
184. Supra note 160 and accompanying text.
185. E.g., 2 BOLINGBROKE, supra note 2, at 100-01, 158.
186. E.g., id. at 101.
187. E.g., id. at 102, 118.
188. Historian Caroline Robbins assessed the Disquisitions as "perhaps the
most important political treatise which appeared in England in the first half of
the reign of George III." ROBBINS, supra note 2, at 357. Relevant excerpts may
be found in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, ch. 2, doc. 6,
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlch2s6.html
(last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
189. On Burgh's popularity, see BAILYN, supra note 2, at 51, 55. On occasion,
Burgh's Political Disquisitions'was cited by name in the constitutional debates.
See, e.g., A Democratic Federalist, PA. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 390 (an anti-federalist writer); THE
FEDERALIST No. 56, supra note 2, at 294 (James Madison). Sometimes Burgh
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legislators to represent faithfully the interests of their
constituents. His work is particularly notable for its empha-
sis on the duty of public trustees to account for their conduct.
Like Locke, he pointed out that private trustees have a duty
to account for their conduct, and that the far greater power
of public trustees suggests that the standard regulating
them ought to be higher rather than lower.' Burgh argued
that the possibility of defeat for re-election was "a very
inadequate punishment.'
192
By the time of the American Revolution, therefore, both
defenders and opponents of the Crown had adopted public
trust views of government. Both sides agreed that public offi-
cials were bound by fiduciary-style obligations. Their chief
disagreement was on the question, "To whom are malfeasant
officials accountable?" In 1778, the influential liberal British
was cited without the name of the work given. See, e.g., 19 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 116-17 (an anti-federalist writer).
For James Wilson's citation of the Political Disquisitions in 1790, see 1
WILSON, supra note 2, at 108.
190. Burgh sometimes used the term "procurator," a Roman law word, as a
substitute for "trustee."
191. 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, ch. 2, doc. 6, available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlch2s6.html (last visited
Dec. 10, 2004):
Milton and Locke bring very substantial arguments for calling even
kings, with all their sacred majesty, their jure divino, and their
impeccability (kings can do no wrong) to account, if they govern in any
manner inconsistent with the good of the people. How much more lords,
or commons, who have never even challenged to themselves any divine
attributes? Jam. I. owned himself to be the great servant of the state.
"Who, says Locke, shall be judge, whether his trustee, or his deputy
[are not members of the house of commons trustees and deputies in the
strictest sense of the word?] acts well, and according to the trust
reposed in him, but he, who deputes him, and must, by having deputed
him, have still power to discard him, when he fails in his trust? If this
be reason in particular cases of private men, why should it be
otherwise in cases of the greatest moment, where the welfare of
millions is concerned!"
192. Id.
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clergyman, Richard Price,' summed up the dispute in this
way:
There are two accounts, directly opposite to one another, which
have been given of the origin of civil government. One of them is
that "civil government is an expedient contrived by human
prudence for gaining security against oppression, and that,
consequently, the power of civil governors is a delegation or trust
from the people for accomplishing this end."
The other account is that "civil government is an ordinance of
the Deity, by which the body of mankind are given up to the will of
a few, and, consequently, that it is a trust from the Deity, in the
exercise of which civil governors are accountable only to him."94
Price added that "[t]he question which of these accounts
we ought to receive is important in the highest degree." Price
cast his vote for the Whig view that officials were account-
able to the people. He helpfully inserted his own partial list
of trust standards: Obey the law, avoid self-dealing, resist
foreign influence, and do not postpone scheduled elections.'95
Yet for our purposes, the points of contemporary argument
are less important than the point of unity: Virtually all con-
temporary English political writers agreed that public
officials should adhere to standards comparable to those im-
posed on private sector fiduciaries.'96 Many-if not all-Whig
193. For Price's public trust ideas, see ROBBINS, supra note 2, at 331. Price
was a friend and neighbor of James Burgh, id. at 358, whose public trust
notions are discussed at supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
Price was regularly cited during the ratification debates. See, e.g., Robert
Yates, Journal (June 27, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2,
at 441 (Luther Martin); Fabius IX, PA. MERCURY, May 1, 1788, reprinted in 17
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 265 (John Dickinson, a delegate to the
national convention and a federalist); Luther Martin, Genuine Information IV,
BALTIMORE MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 1788, reprinted in 15 id. at 301 (then an anti-
federalist); Tamony, supra note 151, at 323 (an anti-federalist).
194. PRICE, supra note 2.
195. Id. "Self-dealing" is my inclusive term for two items mentioned by Price:
Members of Parliament accepting bribes and nominating themselves for
executive office.
196. Richard Price is remembered as a provoking cause of Edmund Burke's
Reflections on the Revolution in France, which is cast as a rebuttal to a sermon
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writers would have agreed with Price when he wrote that
"[parliaments] possess no power beyond the limits of the
trust for the execution of which they were formed. If they
contradict this trust, they betray their constituents and dis-
solve themselves."197
by Price. Yet the Reflections also feature much public trust language. See
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), available at
http://www.constitution.org/eb/rev-fran.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004):
The interest of that portion of social arrangement is a trust in the
hands of all those who compose it; and as none but bad men would
justify it in abuse, none but traitors would barter it away for their own
personal advantage.
That he may secure some liberty, [the citizen] makes a surrender in
trust of the whole of it.
All persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and
awfully impressed with an idea that they act in trust, and that they are
to account for their conduct in that trust.
This [British] government... is a trustee for the whole, and not for
the parts.
And so forth.
197. RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE
PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH
AMERICA (1776), available at http://www.constitution.org/price/price-3.htm (last
visited Sept. 29, 2004); cf LOCKE, supra note 2, at 106 ("[Tihe power of the
society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed to extend
farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's property by
providing against those three defects above mentioned that made the state of
nature so unsafe and uneasy.").
John Dickinson expressed similar sentiments, see Robert G. Natelson, The
Constitutional Contributions of John Dickinson, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 415, 437
(2003). So also did Edmund Randolph. See Edmund Randolph, Virginia
Convention (June 13, 18, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 2, at 362-63,
504-05 (speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention on the limitations of the
treaty power); see also James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against
Religious Assessments (1785), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/
founders/documents/amendIlreligions43.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2004):
Because if Religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large,
still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body. The latter are
but the creatures and vicegerents of the former. Their jurisdiction is both
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E. The Founders' Canon of Legal Sources
1. Text writers
a. Lawyers' Roles in the Founding. Lawyers assumed a
leading role in the American founding. Nearly two-thirds of
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had received
formal training in the law.'98 During the battle over ratifica-
tion, lawyers were prominent among both federalists and
anti-federalists. At the Virginia ratifying convention, for
example, the burden of the federalist arguments was
carried by Chancellor Edmund Pendleton, Governor
Edmund Randolph, Congressman James Madison, George
Nicholas, Francis Corbin, and John Marshall-all lawyers.
The leading anti-federalist spokesman, former Governor
Patrick Henry, was a lawyer, as were his lieutenants,
William Grayson and James Monroe (the future President).
Some of the salient public essayists on both sides of the
question were lawyers: On the federalist side, there were
Alexander Hamilton and John Jay of New York, James
Madison of Virginia, Noah Webster of Connecticut, and
Alexander Contee Hanson of Maryland-to name only a
few. On the anti-federalist side, Judge Robert Yates of New
York was the likely author of the "Brutus" papers.199 Gover-
nor George Clinton, another New York lawyer, was a likely
author of "Cato.""' Many, if not most, of the lawyers among
derivative and limited: it is limited with regard to the co-ordinate
departments, more necessarily is it limited with regard to the
constituents. The preservation of a free Government requires not merely,
that the metes and bounds which separate each department of power be
invariably maintained; but more especially that neither of them be
suffered to overleap the great Barrier which defends the rights of the
people. The Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment, exceed the
commission from which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants.
198. See ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 147.
199. See Brutus I, N.Y. J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 411.
200. On Clinton's career, see A Republican, N.Y. J., Sept. 6, 1787, reprinted
in 13 id. at 141 n.2; on Paul Leicester Ford's belief that he authored the Cato
letters, see id. at 255. Another possible author, Abraham Yates, Jr., was also a
lawyer. For his biography, see Stefan Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., available
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the founders had extensive experience in private law, of
which the law of fiduciaries is a part, and were accustomed
to thinking of government in private law terms.2 '
The views expressed within the contemporary canon of
available legal works °2 on both private fiduciary obligations
and on public service offer further evidence on the content
of prevailing ideas of public service.
b. Duties of Private Fiduciaries. The broad standards of
private fiduciary conduct, particularly the duties of agents,
guardians, executors, and trustees, were not greatly differ-
ent from what they are today. Guardianship had assumed
its modern form as early as the thirteenth century, and the
guardian no longer held a position of profit, but one of fidu-
ciary responsibility. 203 As for an executor, Charles Viner's
treatise held that he was "no more than a Trustee made by
the Testator.""4 Agents were full-fledged fiduciaries also.2 5
at http://www.nysm.nysed.gov/albany/bios/y/ayjranb.html (last visited Dec. 29,
2004). For an overview of the dispute, see 2 STORING, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 2, at 102-103.
201. Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2 (discussing the private
law practices of the members of the Constitution's committee of detail); see also
Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee, June 14, 1788, reprinted
in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1625-26 (comparing the people's
grant of power to various real estate conveyances and to the agency).
202. The canon is described in WARREN, supra note 2, at 157-87.
203. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 444 (1959). Apparently, the
duties of guardians and trustees were very similar to each other. 1 STORY, supra
note 2, at 316, 446.
204. 20 VINER, supra note 2, at 509. The edition I used is in the Biddle
Library at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. It was used in America
around the time of the founding.
205. For a modern-sounding summary of the fiduciary duties of agents
written just a few years after the American Founding, see PALEY, supra note 2,
at 4 (stating that an agent is "bound to use the utmost diligence and care in the
execution of his trust"); id. at 9 (describing agent's obligation of loyalty); see
also 1 KNIGHTLY D'ANvERS, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 609
(2d. ed. 1725) (attorney in fact must act only within the authority given); 3
VINER, supra note 2, at 278 (conflating attorneys in fact and in law with
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Eighteenth-century fiduciary law was, of course,
administered by the courts of equity. "Trust," said one
maxim, "is a creature of Equity, and to be governed and
disposed by its Rules."2 6 In administering fiduciary law, the
chancellors closely followed Roman concepts, as the Scottish
jurist Lord Kames made plain in his popular treatise on eq-
uity. °7 According to Lord Mansfield, 08 trust law had been
placed "on a true foundation" when Lord Nottingham was
chancellor late in the previous century: "By steadily pursu-
ing, from plain principles, trusts in all their consequences,
and by some assistance from the legislature, a noble,
rational, and uniform system of law [had] been raised."0 9
As to the content of the rules governing fiduciaries, the
contemporary sources make clear that by the time of the
guardians); 20 id. at 509 (guardians as trustees). So also were joint mortgagees
trustees for each other and a husband acting for his wife. Id. The case of
servants was similar. 15 id. at 309 (discussing servant's scope of authority). The
editions of Viner and D'Anvers that I consulted are both in the Biddle Library
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and were used in America in the
eighteenth century.
206. PRINCIPIA LEGIS ET AEQUITATIS 116 ("T.B." ed., 1753).
207. See KAMES, supra note 2, at 243-44 ("where a subject is vested in a
trustee for behoof of a third party, the children nascituri [about to be born] of a
marriage for example. A trust of this nature [is] analogous to a fideicommissary
settlement among the Romans").
The book was used in America as well as in Britain. Kames was one of
Thomas Jefferson's favorite authors, and three editions of this particular book
were in Jefferson's library. GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 201 (Houghton Mifflin 2002) (1978). James
Wilson cited him repeatedly during his 1790 lectures on law, misspelling his
name "Kaims." See WILSON, supra note 2, at 90-91, 100, 195, 484-48. Kames
made an occasional appearance in the ratification debates. See, e.g., Centinel XI
(Jan. 16, 1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2. at 389; "A
Foreign Spectator," An Essay on the Means of Promoting Federal Sentiments in
the United States (Aug. 17, 1787), reprinted in FRIENDS, supra note 2, at 418.
208. Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, 1756-88. A brief
biography is available at http://law.wlu.edu/faculty/history/brockenbrough/
mansfield.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
209. Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden 177, 223, 28 Eng. Rep. 652, 670 (1757)
(opinion of Mansfield, C.J.).
2004] THE PUBLIC TRUST 1127
American Founding, the fundamental fiduciary responsi-
bilities were already well established. An anonymous 1751
tract by a lawyer at Gray's Inn (one of London's Inns of
Court for training law students) said of the duties of chari-
table trustees, "Trustees for a charity may improve for the
benefit of the charity, but can do no act to prejudice it."' 1°
Similarly, an anonymous English treatise of 1737 stated
that "no Act of the Trustee shall prejudice the Cestui que
Trust."21' Henry Swinburne wrote that the duties of an
executor required him to be "prudent, diligent, and faith-
ful"-that is, not "ignorant, negligent, or unfaithful" in the
"discharge [of] that Trust. 2 1 ' Lord Kames referred to the
guardian's duties (Kames used the civil law term "tutor") to
210. THE GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS OF LAw AND EQUITY, ALPHABETICALLY
DIGESTED, BY A GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE 486 (1751).
211. A TREATISE OF EQUITY, supra note 2, at 72; see also GENERAL ABRIDGE-
MENT, supra note 2, at 384 (similar statement); cf. EDWARD BURTENSHAW
SUGDEN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF POwERS 391 (1808) (referring obliquely to the
duty of a trustee not to "increase the income of the tenant for life at the expense
of the persons entitled to the inheritance"-that is, to the fiduciary duty of
impartiality).
212. 1 HENRY SWINBURNE, A TREATISE ON TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS 417
(6th ed. 1743); cf 20 VINER, supra note 2, at 521 (stating that cestui que trust
must hold trustee harmless for expenses, but only those laid out "honestly and
fairly, without a Possibility of being a Gainer" (i.e., there could be no conflict of
interest). The edition of Swinburne I consulted is in the Biddle Library at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and was used in America in the
eighteenth century.
For other examples of the duty of care imposed on fiduciaries, see A
TREATISE OF EQUITY, supra note 2, at 74 (opining that in strong cases of
negligence, a trustee may be chargeable with "imaginary Values," i.e.,
speculative damages); cf 1 STORY, supra note 2, at 446; 2 id. at 510-12, 514,
517.
The strict duty of care for agents was clearly described in PALEY, supra note 2,
at 4-6, but I have not included it in the text for Paley's work was written a few
years after the founding.
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proceed in good faith 13 and act "to the best of his skill for
the good of his pupil [ward]." 14
By the eighteenth century, both private guardians and
private trustees had an absolute duty to eschew self-deal-
ing. Lord Kames includes this modern-sounding passage:
But equity goes farther, and prohibits a trustee from making any
profit by his management, directly or indirectly. However innocent
an act of this nature may be in itself, it is poisonous with regard to
its consequences; for if any opportunity be given for making profit
in this manner, a trustee will lose sight of his duty, and soon learn
to direct his management chiefly or solely for his own profit. It is
solely upon this foundation that a tutor [guardian] is barred from
making profit, by purchasing debts due by his pupil [ward], or
rights affecting his estate. 215
Similarly, Charles Viner summarized the law as pro-
viding that "no Trustee, or any Person acting under a
Trustee, can ever be a Purchaser [from the trust] on Account
of the great Inlet [sic] to Fraud."2
c. Application to Government. The Anglo-American
legal canon, consisting of both works of civil and common
law, explicitly and repeatedly promoted the application of
fiduciary norms to government. One of the most celebrated
213. See KAMES, supra note 2, at 108 (intention to disadvantage ward is
tortious); cf 2 STORY, supra note 2, at 510.
214. KAMES, supra note 2, at 108. Accordingly, guardians were under a duty
to account to their wards, see GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 2, at 263.
215. KAMES, supra note 2, at 255; cf GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 2, at
384 (self-dealing trustee who later purchases for consideration land he sold still
holds it subject to the trust); A TREATISE OF EQuITY, supra note 2, at 73 (opining
that trustees are to be uncompensated); see also 1 STORY, supra note 2, at 317-18,
446. Story relies at this point almost entirely on English cases, many from the
eighteenth century or earlier. Relevant to the theme of this Article is that, to
support his point on self-dealing, Story quotes a Roman legal opinion from
Justinian's Digest involving a breach of trust by a public magistrate. 2 id. at 519-
20.
216. 13 VINER, supra note 2, at 540.
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civilians-influential not only among lawyers,217 but also
referenced during the public debate over ratification 2 1 8-was
Samuel Von Pufendorf.219 This is the same Pufendorf, by the
way, cited several times in Pierson v. Post,"' the immortal
New York "fox chasing" case still regularly inflicted on
American law students. Pufendorf s De Officio Hominis et
Civis was published in 1682 and translated into English in
1691 by Andrew Tooke as The Whole Duty of Man, Accord-
ing to the Law of Nature.
22
Pufendorf's treatise included a chapter on the duty of
rulers that, while not using the terms "trust" or "fiduciary,"
included a list of restrictions that were clearly fiduciary in
nature: A ruler should conduct affairs for the public good.
2 23
He should promote economic prosperity24 and defend the
125
nation. The ruler must apply himself "with the utmost
217. Around 1760, one of the leaders of the New York bar recommended
Pufendorf to the young John Jay. WARREN, supra note 2, at 170. The same year,
the young John Adams recorded a number of legal works he had read, but
regretted that he had yet to "read any part of the best authors Pufendorf and
Grotius." Id. at 172. In his 1790 lectures on law, James Wilson repeatedly cited
Pufendorf. WILSON, supra note 2, at 870.
218. See, e.g., Cincinnatus V, N.Y. J., Nov. 29, 1787, reprinted in 14 DoCU-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 308 (an anti-federalist author). James
Wilson cited Pufendorf at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. James Wilson,
Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at
454. William Grayson made a slighting reference at the Virginia convention in a
context that showed many delegates had heard the name. William Grayson,
Virginia Convention (June 13, 1788), in 3 id. at 350.
219. See PUFENDORF, supra note 2. An English translation is also available
at http://www.constitution.org/puf/puf-dut.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
220. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
221. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 19-22 (5th ed.
2002).
222. PUFENDORF, supra note 2, at ix.
223. See id. at 215.
224. See id. at 219.
225. See id. at 220
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Diligence, to the Study of whatever may conduce to give him
a perfect Comprehension of the Affairs belonging to a Person
in his Station."226 The ruler should perfect the virtues neces-
sary for his office. 27 He should choose as his agents, "Men of
Probity and Sense, experienced in Business, and skilful in
the Ways of the World."228 He should adopt suitable laws
which should be easy to read and not excessive in number.226
He should enforce the laws equally and without favor, and
inflict punishments proportionate to the gravity of the
offense."' He should keep taxes as light as possible,23'
promote the Christian religion 23 2 and hinder the growth of
factions.233
This list was similar to that proposed by another widely-
read civilian, Emmerich Vattel. Vattel's The Law of Nations
or the Principles of Natural Law was published in French in
1758 and introduced to the United States in 1775, where its
acceptance was rapid.2 4 James Madison cited it at the
federal convention,"' and James Wilson did so at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention."s Vattel's list of official
226. Id. at 215.
227. See id.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 216.
230. See id. at 217.
231. See id. at 219.
232. See id. at 216.
233. See id. at 220.
234. See Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction to VATTEL, supra note 2, at xxx
(George D. Gregory trans.).
235. See James Madison, Journal (June 27, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 437-38, 440.
236. See James Wilson, Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 454.
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obligations was similar to that of Pufendorf, and unlike
Pufendorf, he employed explicit trust language.
Vattel maintained that government is established for the
common good, 23  and the ruler's power is accordingly
limited.2"9 A ruler who abuses his trust can forfeit his
authority.240 The ruler should obey and enforce the law,241
choose good ministers 2 2 avoid self-dealing,24 ' and become
knowledgeable about the state he rules.2" The ruler should
defend the state245 and improve its overall condition.246
Baron Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws was more about
politics than about law, and the founding generation made it
one of their favorite books of political theory. Indeed, the
records of the constitutional debates contain numerous
references to "the celebrated Montesquieu "24' and "the great
237. See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 2, at 21.
238. Id. at 20.
239. Id. at 22.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 21.
243. Id. at 20-21.
244. Id. at 21-22.
245. Id. at 21.
246. Id.
247. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 2, at 250 (James Madison); id.
No. 78, at 402 n. (Alexander Hamilton); George Nicholas, Virginia Convention
(June 12, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 247; Edmund
Randolph, Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), in id. at 84; see also Dissent of
the Minority of the Convention, The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the
Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents
(Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 DOcUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 629.
This is only a sample of a large number.
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Montesquieu .,,2" He was cited repeatedly by federalists and
anti-federalists alike in newspaper columns"' and in conven-
tion debates.25 °
The Spirit of Laws contains public trust language.251
Montesquieu opined that a magistrate in a popular govern-
ment was subject to the direction of the laws.25 He said that
in republics a citizen "entrusted" with public employment-
indeed, any citizen-ought "to live, to act, and to think" for
the sake of his fellow citizens alone.253 The common good was
the proper goal of republics. He famously preferred small
248. John Williams, New York Convention (June 27, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 340; John Dawson, Virginia Convention (June 24,
1788), in 3 id. at 612.
249. His name appears in THE FEDERALIST No. 9, supra note 2, at 41-44
(Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 78, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 43, at
225 (James Madison); id. No. 47, at 269-72 (James Madison). Examples of anti-
federalist citations include A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN, A REVIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA
(1787), reprinted in 3 STORING, supra note 2, at 69, 73, 77; Centinel I, PHILA.
INDEP. GAZETEER, Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 332; An Old Whig II, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETEER, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted
in id. at 401.
250. Massachusetts Convention (1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2,
at 13 (Gen. Heath), 14 (Gen. Brooks), 16-17 (Christopher Gore), 126-28 (James
Bowdoin) (all federalists); Melancton Smith, New York Convention (June 20,
1788), in id. at 224 (an anti-federalist); James Wilson, Pennsylvania Convention
(1787), in id. at 421, 482 (a federalist); Virginia Convention (1788), in id. at 84
(Edmund Randolph, federalist), 165 (Patrick Henry, anti-federalist), 279-80,
288 (William Grayson, anti-federalist), 294 (Edmund Pendleton, federalist).
251. Montesquieu often wrote of a government official being "entrusted"
with power. In addition to the references in the text, see MONTESQUIEU, supra
note 2, at 4 ("The people are extremely well qualified for choosing those whom
they are to entrust with part of their authority."); id. at 15 ("This love is
peculiar to democracies. In these alone the government is entrusted to private
citizens." [in Montesquieu's taxonomy, republics were divided into aristocracies
and democracies]); id. at 73 ("[T]he conduct of him who is entrusted with the
executive power" and "a subject entrusted with the administration of public
affairs"). There are many other illustrations.
252. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 9.
253. See id. at 31.
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over large republics partly because he believed that in larger
republics impartial dedication to the common good was less
likely than in smaller ones.5 4
By 1787, William Blackstone's Commentaries had
become the standard elementary law book in America.2 " Like
Montesquieu, Blackstone's popularity spread far beyond the
bounds of the legal profession, and he was cited often during
the constitutional debate.256 Blackstone identified legislators,
judges, and magistrates as being in public trust, noting
254. See id. at 56:
In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and
consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too considerable to be
placed in any single subject; he has interests of his own; he soon begins
to think that he may be happy and glorious, by oppressing his
fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins
of his country.
In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand
private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on
accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is more obvious,
better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses
have less extent, and of course are less protected.
255. On Blackstone's influence, see WARREN, supra note 2, at 177-80.
256. For example, at the Philadelphia convention, Blackstone was cited by
Alexander Hamilton, see 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 472, and John
Dickinson, see 2 id. at 448. At the state ratifying conventions, several delegates
resorted to Blackstone. See, e.g., James Wilson, Explanatory of the General
Principles of the Proposed Federal Constitution (1787), reprinted in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 348; Virginia Convention (1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 501 (James Madison), 506 (George Nicholas),
544 (Patrick Henry). Blackstone also appeared in pamphlets and newspaper
commentaries. See, e.g., Plain Truth: Reply to an Officer of the Late Continental
Army, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETEER, Nov. 7, 1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 219; WILLIAM BARTON, ON THE PROPRIETY OF
INVESTING CONGRESS WITH POWER TO REGULATE TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES
(1787), reprinted in 13 id. at 53; West-Chester Farmer, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER,
June 8, 1787, reprinted in id. at 128-29; THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 2,
at 357, 359 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 84, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton).
These are only a sample of a large number of convention references.
257. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *10 (members of Parliament), *12
(judges), *50 (legislative power), *56 (executive power), *161 (Parliament); see
also id. at *13 ("those who are entrusted by their country to maintain, to
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that, unlike some other offices, offices of public trust could
not be incorporeal hereditaments;255 and he reported that
those who violated the public trust through maladministra-
tion could be impeached.
2. Existing State Constitutions
The royal charters governing several of the American
colonies had been granted "upon Trust" for the benefit of the
settlers in those colonies.260 After adoption of the Declaration
of Independence, the drafters of most of the state constitu-
tions similarly resorted to the public trust doctrine. To be
sure, several constitutions employed the terms "trust" or
"public trust" merely as synonyms for public office. Thus, the
constitution of Delaware referred to a member of the execu-
tive council "remain[ing] in trust for three years from the
time of his being elected, "2 1 members of the legislative and
privy councils serving as "justices of the peace for the wholeState, during their continuance in trust,"22 and so forth.2 1
administer, and to amend [the laws]"), *48 (entrusting the "reins of
government"), *49 (stating that in a monarchy government "[the sovereign
power] is entrusted in the hands of a single person").
258. 2 id. at *37.
259. 4 id. at *122.
260. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
261. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. IV, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/states/de02.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
262. Id. art. XII.
263. Id. art. XXII ("Every person who shall be chosen a member of either house,
or appointed to any office or place of trust, before taking his seat, or entering upon
the execution of his office, shall take the following oath, or affirmation .... ).
Among the state constitutions with similar usages were Georgia, Maryland, and
Massachusetts. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. XI, XV, available at http//
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ga02.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004); MD.
CONST. of 1776, arts. XXXI, XXXII, XXXV, XXXIX, LII-LV, available at httpJ/www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ma02.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004); MASS. CONST.
of 1780, Part the Second, ch. I, § 2, art. VIII, available at http/www.nhinet.
org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004); id. ch. VI, art. I; id. ch. II, § 3,
art. II; see also N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. XII, XXXII, available at http://www.yale.
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However, other state constitutions were more specific about
the nature of government as a public trust. For example, the
constitution of Maryland provided
That all persons invested with the legislative or executive powers
of government are the trustees of the public, and, as such,
accountable for their conduct; wherefore, whenever the ends of
government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly
endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the
people may, and of right ought, to reform the old or establish a
new government.
Similar statements of public trust doctrine were inserted
into the constitutions of Pennsylvania,2  Virginia,2 6 and of
the incipient state of Vermont. 16 These were the constitu-
edu/law/web/avalon/statesnc07.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004); N.J. CONST. of
1776, art. XIX, available at http'//www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/njl5.htm
(last visited Dec. 10, 2004); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIII, available at httpi/
www.yale.edu/awweb/avalon/states/ny0l.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004); S.C.
CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVI, available at httpi/www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
states/sc02.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
264. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. IV, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/states/ma02.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
265. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IV, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/states/pa08.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004) ("That all power being
originally inherent in, and consequently derived from, the people; therefore all
officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and
servants, and at all times accountable to them.").
266. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 2, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/states/va05.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004) ("That all power is vested in,
and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees
and servants, and at all times amenable to them.").
267. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, art. VI, available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/states/vt02.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004) ("That all power
being originally inherent in, and consequently derived from the people;
therefore, all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their
trustees and servants, and at all times, in a legal way, accountable to them.");
see also VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. V, available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/states/vtOl.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004). Accord MASS.
CONST. of 1780, Part the First, art. V ("All power residing originally in the
people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of
government vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial,
1136 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
tions under which the various states commissioned their
delegates to the national convention in Philadelphia. In
other words, these were the constitutions from which the
convention delegates derived their authority.
V. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
A by-product of the constitutional debate of 1787-91 was
an outpouring of transcripts, letters, notes, newspaper arti-
cles and essays, pamphlets, broadsides, and transcribed
orations. From this record, examined in the light of the
Founders' literary canon, 26 we can deduce in many cases
269
the purposes and "original meaning"27° of constitutional
clauses that today seem unclear. We also can discern the
prevalence of the public trust doctrine.271 Like the concepts of
republicanism, 72  "sympathy," and "independence," 7  the
are the substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them"),
available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm (last visited Dec. 10,
2004).
268. See supra Part IV.
269. Not all cases, of course. On some clauses the record is not sufficient. On
others, people on one or both sides were hopelessly divided.
270. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS (1996); Randy E.
Barnett, An Originalism for Non-Originalists, 45 LoY. L. REV. 611 (1999);
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretative Force of the
Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1133, 1144-48 (2003).
271. For example, the term "public trust" appears seven times in THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 2, available at http://www.constitution.org/
fedlfederali.txt (last visited Dec. 10, 2004). The term "guardian" or
"guardianship" appears twenty times. The terms "public servant" (or analogous
usages), "trustee," and "agent" also appear very frequently throughout the
publication.
272. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supka note 2, at 4-5.
273. See Natelson, Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at 353
(discussing the founding generation's widely shared views that (1) in a republic,
citizens should be independent decision makers; (2) the decision-making branches
of government should be independent of each other; and (3) government should be
"sympathetic" with the people). For an influential contemporary discussion of the
value and meaning of "sympathy," see generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF
THE PUBLIC TRUST
public trust doctrine seems to have been an ideal that almost
everyone agreed on. As we shall see, moreover, it was an
ideal with real-world legal implications.
This Part V discusses the direct role of the public trust
doctrine in the drafting, submission, and ratification of the
Constitution. This part is divided into five subparts, each
discussing the founding generation's adherence to one of the
five fiduciary standards listed above as potentially applicable
to government officials. These are the duty to follow instruc-
tions, the duty of reasonable care, the duty of loyalty, the
duty of impartiality, and the duty to account.
A. The Duty to Follow Instructions
The law imposes on private fiduciaries a duty to follow
instructions-that is to comply with the purposes and rules
of the relationship24 For the participants in the constitu-
tional debate, the analogous public duty was to comply with
rules designed to serve the sole legitimate purpose of gov-
ernment: the promotion of the common good or general
welfare."' "P. Valerius Agricola," a federalist author, re-
flected the dominant social compact view when he wrote:
MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie eds., 1982) (1759), available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
274. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
275. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 53-65 (1969) (illustrating that the founding generation's
republicanism included the notion that the state existed for the public good). Cf
William Barton, On the Propriety of Investing Congress with the Power to
Regulate the Trade of the United States (1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 52 ("It is the business of congress to promote the
'mutual and general welfare' of ALL the states, and their duty to consult the
interests of EACH, so far as is compatible with those of the whole."); Impartial,
INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 16, 1787, reprinted in 2 id. at *644 (microfiche
supplement) ("The great and ultimate end of government is the happiness and
prosperity of the people."); Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams
(Apr. 28, 1978), reprinted in 17 id. at 230 (writing that the states must be
"confederated for the common good"); Letter from Roger Sherman (Dec. 8, 1777),
in 14 id. at 389 ("In order to [have] a well regulated government, the legislature
Should [sic] be dependant on the people, and be vested with a plenetude [sic] of
power, for all the purposes, for which it is instituted, to be exercised for the
public good, as occasion may require, powers are dangerous only when trust in
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It was then, that the individual, impelled by fear and attentive to
the suggestions of reason, intrusted a portion of his natural liberty
to the care of community, which became thus enabled to afford
him protection against the dangers incident to a state of
nature ....
From a review of the foregoing observations, we may then infer,
that the design of civil government is, the security and happiness
of community, and by no means the aggrandisement of an
individual or a few ....
The participants believed that government should
receive sufficient powers to execute its trust.2 7 However, care
should be taken not to give government too much authority.
The Pennsylvania Herald opined that "all power is a delega-
tion from the people for their own advantage [and] no
greater portion of it should be any where entrusted than is
officers not under the controul [sic] of the laws.") (alteration in original); Letter
from George Washington to John Armstrong, Sr. (Apr. 25, 1788), reprinted in 17
id. at 215 (writing of the "general welfare" and "general interest").
276. P. Valerius Agricola, ALB. GAZ., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 19 id. at 188
(emphasis added); see also Cincinnatus, LANSINGBURGH N. CENTINEL, Oct. 15,
1787, reprinted in 19 id. at 87 ("Cincinnatus" the federalist, as distinguished
from the author, "Cincinnatus," in volume 13):
From the first formation of society, it has ever been found absolutely
necessary for the welfare, happiness and good of mankind, that they
should give up a part of their liberties in trust for the preservation of
the remainder.
As individuals, we have by our present excellent [New York]
constitution, given those powers which were conceived necessary for
our welfare to our fellow citizens and neighbours, chosen by ourselves;
and of our own free will they have the preservation of our lives,
liberties and properties entrusted to their care.
Id. (emphasis added).
277. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 2, at 113 (Alexander Hamilton)
(arguing "that government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to
complete execution of its trust"); John Marshall, Virginia Convention (June 10,
1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 225 (making essentially the same
argument).
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necessary to accomplish the end proposed."27 Both federal-
ists27 9 and anti-federalists agreed that an official exceeding
the scope of his limited powers thereby breached the public
trust. An anti-federalist writer, "A Citizen of Maryland,"
quoted Lord Abington with approval:
My idea of government. . . ., to speak as a lawyer would do, is, that
the legislatures are the trustees of the people, the constitution the
deed of gift, wherein they stood seized to uses only, and those uses
being named, they cannot depart from them; but for their due
performance are accountable to those by whose conveyance the trust
was made. The right is therefore fiduciary, the power limited .... 280
The drafters of the Constitution included several provi-
sions designed to promote and enforce the duty to follow
278. Editorial, PA. HERALD, June 9, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 131.
279. See, e.g., ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON, REMARKS ON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF
A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, ADDRESSED TO THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, AND PARTICULARLY TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND (1788), reprinted in 15 id.
at 536 (arguing from a federalist perspective that exceeding one's powers is a breach
of trust and implying, although not stating, that impeachment is the remedy).
280. LUTHER MARTIN, A CITIZEN OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND: REMARKS
RELATIVE TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1788), reprinted in 17 id. at 92. For another
anti-federalist statement of the public trust doctrine, see The Impartial
Examiner I, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 8 id. at 389:
These are in all just governments laid down as a foundation to the civil
compact, which contains a covenant between each with all, that they
shall enter into one society to be governed by the same powers;
establishes for that purpose the frame of government; and consequently
creates a Convention [i.e., an agreement] between every member, binding
those, who shall at any time be intrusted with power, to a faithful
administration of their trust according to the form of the civil policy,
which they have so constituted, and obliging all to a due obedience
therein.
See also The Impartial Examiner I, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Feb. 27, 1788, reprinted
in id. at 420 (stating that those entrusted with political power should observe
two essential rules: "first in having no other view than the general good of all
without any regard to private interest; and secondly, to take equal care of the
whole body of the community, so as not to favor one part more than another").
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instructions. In the Preamble,281 they set forth the purposes
of the trust, including the promotion of the 'general
Welfare." They enumerated the powers of Congress,2 Presi-
dent,283 and courts284 so as to instruct federal fiduciaries on
what they could and could not do. The Constitution was to be
the "supreme Law of the Land," ' 5 thereby empowering
courts to invalidate statutes and other official actions outside
the scope of, or otherwise in violation of, the rules of the
trust.
2 6
281. U.S. CONST. pmbl.:
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
282. Id. art. I, § 8.
283. Id. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
284. Id. art. III, § 2.
285. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
286. Federal laws became the supreme law of the land only to the extent they
that were enacted pursuant to "the enumerated and legitimate objects" of federal
jurisdiction. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, supra note 2, at 135 (Alexander Hamilton).
The prospective power of the courts to invalidate unconstitutional federal
actions was repeatedly referenced during the ratification debates. See, e.g.,
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, ch. 17, available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchl7s22.html (last visited Sept. 25,
2004); THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 2, at 117 (Alexander Hamilton); id.
No. 44, at 285-86 (James Madison); James Sullivan, Cassius XI, MASS.
GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1787, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788,
at 43, 46 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892). See also Oliver Ellsworth's comments
(later chief justice of the United States) at the Connecticut ratifying convention:
If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which
the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power,
the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made
independent, will declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the states
go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is a usurpation upon
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While fully subscribing to the public trust doctrine, anti-
federalists argued that the Constitution would not do an
adequate job of forcing government officials to honor the
rules. Among other contentions, they maintained that the
Constitution should have specified with greater precision
exactly what federal officials were and were not permitted to
do. The comments of the anti-federalist essayist "John
DeWitt" were typical:
A people, entering into society, surrender such a part of their
natural rights, as shall be necessary for the existence of that
society. They are so precious in themselves, that they would never
be parted with, did not the preservation of the remainder require
it. They are entrusted in the hands of those, who are very willing
to receive them, who are naturally fond of exercising of them, and
whose passions are always striving to make a bad use of them.-
They are conveyed by a written compact, expressing those which
are given up, and the mode in which those reserved shall be
secured. Language is so easy of explanation, and so difficult is it by
words to convey exact ideas, that the party to be governed cannot
be too explicit. The line cannot be drawn with too much precision
and accuracy.8 7
The "Citizen of the State of Maryland" had the same
concern: "I do not perceive in the new constitution, those uses
named, for which the administration of government is
entrusted; no directing principles, sufficient for security of
the general government, the law is void; and upright, independent
judges will declare it to be so.
On the Power of Congress to Lay Taxes (Jan. 7, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 196. For still further examples, see James Wilson,
Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in id. at 446, 478, 489; Virginia
Convention (1788), in 3 id. at 324-25, 541 (Patrick Henry praising the practice
of the Virginia courts in invalidating unconstitutional legislation, and
wondering whether the federal judiciary would have the fortitude to do the
same); id. at 443 (George Nicholas arguing "if [Congress] exceed[s] these
powers, the judiciary will declare it void"); id. at 548 (Edmund Pendleton); id. at
553 (John Marshall); John Steele, North Carolina Convention (July 25, 1788),
in 4 id. at 71.
287. John DeWitt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts II, AM. HERALD (Boston), Oct.-Dec. 1787, reprinted in 4 STORING,
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 21 (emphasis added), available at http:ll
www.constitution.org/afp/dewitt02.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
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life, liberty, property, and freedom in trade; and therefore, as
a supplement a declaration or bill of rights is evidently
wanting ....
As part of the constitutional settlement, therefore, the
first ten amendments 289 were added to define the rules of the
trust more carefully and narrowly.29 °
B. The Duty of Reasonable Care
Authors in the founding generation's literary canon had
contended that public officials had a duty of care.2 9' There is
every indication that the participants on both sides of the
debate agreed. On the federalist side, James Madison
stressed the need for officials to acquire sufficient knowledge
to execute their functions,292 and argued for a governmental
structure that would minimize official "indiscretions."93
288. LUTHER MARTIN, supra note 280, at 92.
289. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
290. See, e.g., Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 473-75, 479.
291. See supra notes 79 (Plato), 117 (Grotius), 156 (Sidney on the duty to
select competent agents), 179 ("Cato" on diligence), 185 (Bolingbroke) and
accompanying text.
292. James Madison, Journal (June 21, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 361 (arguing that representatives should have a
longer term than one year to provide them with "the time requisite for new
members who would always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge
of the affairs of the States in general without which their trust could not be
usefully discharged"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 57, supra note 2, at 295
(James Madison) ("The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first
to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to
pursue, the common good of the society.").
293. See, e.g., James Madison, Journal (June 7, 1787), reprinted in 1
FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 151-52 (arguing against a large Senate
because "[t]he more the representatives of the people therefore were multiplied,
the more they partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the more liable
they became to be divided among themselves either from their own
indiscretions or the artifices of the opposite factions, and of course the less
capable of fulfilling their trust"); see also id. at 421-22 (June 26, 1787) (stating
"[i]n this they wd. be governed by the same prudence which has prevailed in
organizing the subordinate departments of Govt. where all business liable to
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Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts (a former President of
Congress and the chairman of the federal convention's com-
mittee of the whole) emphasized the national executive's
duty to select competent agents.294 On the anti-federalist
side, George Clinton, the Governor of New York, writing as
"Cato," reflected the views of Locke and of an earlier
"Cato"-Trenchard and Gordon-by asserting that public
administration calls for a higher standard of care than that
applicable to the private sector. Clinton firmly rejected the
"good enough for government work" attitude that so often
characterizes public administration today:
In your private concerns and affairs of life you deliberate with
caution, and act with prudence; your public concerns require a
caution and prudence, in a ratio, suited to the difference and
dignity of the subject. The disposal of your reputation and of your
lives and property, is more momentous than a contract for a farm,
or the sale of a bale of goods; in the former, if you are negligent or
inattentive, the ambitious and despotic will entrap you in their
toils, and bind you with the cord of power from which you, and
your posterity, may never be freed; and if the possibility should
exist, it carries along with it consequences that will make your
community totter to its center: in the latter, it is a mere loss of a
little property, which more circumspection, or assiduity, may
repair.
In order to promote care in government, the drafters of
the Constitution imposed minimum age and residency
requirements on Representatives,296 Senators,"' and the
abuses is made to pass thro' separate hands, the one being a check on the
other"); James Madison, Journal (July 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 id. at 65
(discussing remedies for lack of capacity and other breaches of trust).
294. Nathaniel Gorham, Journal (July 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 id. at 42
(arguing that"[a]s the Executive will be responsible in point of character at
least, for a judicious and faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful to look
through all the States for proper characters").
295. Cato I, N.Y. J., Sept. 27, 1787, reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 59-60.
296. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 2.
297. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
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President.298 They inserted an executive veto partly to serve
as a safeguard against improvident legislation.299 They added
other safeguards against carelessness as well: the Presi-
dent's power to insist that department heads' advice be in
writing,"' the Senate's prerogative to approve or reject
nominations,"' and representation from relatively small dis-
tricts so legislators would be knowledgeable about, as well as
sympathetic with, the people they were representing.
2
Predictably, federalist authors hailed these provisions
during the ensuing debates. By way of illustration, Tench
Coxe, one of the most prolific advocates of the Constitution,
wrote of the President, that he "must be matured by the
experience of years, and being born among us, his character
at thirty-five must be fully understood. Wisdom, virtue, and
298. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
299. See, e.g., the discussion of the role of the Presidential veto in THE
FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 2, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton).
300. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
301. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. On the role of this provision in increasing the
likelihood that competent people would be appointed, see THE FEDERALIST No.
66, supra note 2, at 345 (Alexander Hamilton).
302. See, e.g., James Madison, Journal (July 26, 1787), reprinted in 2
FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 123-24:
It was politic as well as just that the interests & rights of every class
should be duly represented & understood in the public Councils. It was
a provision every where established that the Country should be divided
into districts & representatives taken from each, in order that the
Legislative Assembly might equally understand & sympathise, with
the rights of the people in every part of the Community. It was not less
proper that every class of Citizens should have an opportunity of
making their rights be felt & understood in the public Councils.
See also Melancton Smith, New York Convention (June 20, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 245:
The idea that naturally suggests itself to our minds, when we speak of
representatives, is, that they resemble those they represent. They
should be a true picture of the people, possess a knowledge of their
circumstances and their wants, sympathize in all their distresses, and
be disposed to seek their true interests.
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active qualities of mind and body can alone make him the
first servant of a free and enlightened people." 3 Of represen-
tatives, Coxe said, "At twenty-one a young man is made the
guardian of his own interests, but he cannot for a few years
more be entrusted with the affairs of the nation. 30 4
While conceding that the principle was sound, anti-
federalists feared the Constitution did not go far enough in
securing that principle. "Brutus" (perhaps Judge Robert
Yates, a federal convention delegate from New York) argued
that under the Constitution, "the representation in the leg-
islature is not so formed as to give reasonable ground for
public trust."0 5 The pseudonymous author maintained:
A legislature should pursue the good of the community with
fidelity; and will not be turned aside from their duty by private
interest, or corrupted by undue influence; and that they will have
such a zeal for the good for those whom they represent, as to excite
them to be deligient [sic] in their service .... [However, Congress
under the Constitution] will not be viewed by the people as part of
themselves, but as a body distinct from them, and having separate
interests to pursue; the consequence will be, that a perpetual
jealousy will exist in the minds of the people against them; their
conduct will be narrowly watched; their measures scrutinized; and
their laws opposed, evaded, or reluctantly obeyed. This is natural,
and exactly corresponds with the conduct of individuals toward
those in whose hands they intrust important concerns.0 6
303. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen I, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Sept. 26,
1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 250. On the age
requirement as promoting knowledge and wisdom, see also THE FEDERALIST No.
62, supra note 2, at 319 (James Madison); id. No. 64, at 333 (John Jay).
304. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen III, supra note 22, at 272-73.
305. Brutus IV, N.Y. J., Nov. 29, 1787, reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 313.
306. Id. at 316. "Brutus" then went on to say that when one entrusts
concerns to a neighbor, the neighbor is trusted more than a stranger, who is
watched with suspicion. Id. at 316-17.
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C. The Duty of Loyalty
Algernon Sidney had written that "[g]overnment is not
instituted for the good of the Governor, but of the governed;
and Power is not an Advantage, but a Burden." ' At the
national convention, Hamilton argued for long terms for
senators to "induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an
acceptance of public trust would require, so as to ensure the
services of the best Citizens." °8 Pierce Butler of South
Carolina contended for strong barriers against the executive
"corrupting" legislators by granting them offices. °9 Madison
sought mechanisms to prevent the President from betraying
his trust by accepting bribes, stealing, or benefiting from un-
favorable dealings with foreign powers.3" Gouverneur Morris
307. SIDNEY, supra note 2, at 91. For a founding-generation sentiment along
the same lines, see P. Valerius Agricola, supra note 276, at 188 ("[T]he design
of civil government is, the security and happiness of community, and by not
means the aggrandisement of an individual or a few....").
308. James Madison, Journal (June 18, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 289-90.
309. Id. at 391 (June 23, 1787).
310. 2 id. at 65-66 (July 20, 1787):
[I]t [is] indispensable that some provision should be made for defending
the Community agst [sic] the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the
chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service, was not a
sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his appointment.
He might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or
oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers. The case of the
Executive Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the
Legislative or of any other public body, holding offices of limited
duration. It could not be presumed that all or even a majority of the
members of an Assembly would either lose their capacity for
discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the restraints of
their personal integrity & honor, the difficulty of acting in concert for
purposes of corruption was a security to the public. And if one or a few
members only should be seduced, the soundness of the remaining
members, would maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body. In the
case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be administered by a
single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the compass
of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic.
Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 2, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton):
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of Pennsylvania pointed out that when there is identity of in-
terest between trustee and beneficiary, breaches are less
likely.311 He also argued for impeachment as a proper remedy
for breach of trust. 
2
The proposed Constitution contained various provisions
designed to render federal officials loyal to the public, with
In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the
suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence and
power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which to any
but minds actuated by superior virtue, may appear to exceed the
proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to
overbalance the obligations of duty. Hence it is, that history furnishes
us with so many mortifying examples of the prevalency [sic] of foreign
corruption in republican governments.
311. James Madison, Journal (July 24, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 104:
The Legislature is worthy of unbounded confidence in some respects,
and liable to equal distrust in others. When their interest coincides
precisely with that of their Constituents, as happens in many of their
Acts, no abuse of trust is to be apprehended. When a strong personal
interest happens to be opposed to the general interest, the Legislature
can not be too much distrusted.
Cf Letter from Roger Sherman (Dec. 8, 1787), in HUTSON, SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 2, at 286:
In every government there is a trust, which may be abused; but the
greatest security against abuse is, that the interest of those in whom
the powers of government are vested is the same as that of the people
they govern, and that they are dependent on the suffrage of the people
for their appointment to and continuance in office.
312. James Madison, Journal (July 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra
note 2, at 68:
Mr. Govr. Morris,'s [sic] opinion had been changed by the arguments
used in the discussion. He was now sensible of the necessity of
impeachments, if the Executive was to continue for any time in office.
Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life interest, much
less like one having an hereditary interest in his office. He may be
bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say
that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first
Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst [sic] it by
displacing him.
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as few conflicting interests as possible. The drafters sought
to make each branch of government-federal and state,
legislative, executive, and judicial-relatively independent
from the others' undue influence.313 To prevent executive and
state "corruption" of Congress, Senators and Representatives
were privileged from arrest in most cases, and their state-
ments on the floor immune. 1 6 Moreover, Senators and
Representatives were not to serve in the executive branch
nor accept, even on resignation, newly-created or newly-
enhanced executive offices." 5 Correspondingly, to prevent
congressional corruption of the President, the legislature
could not vary his compensation during his term."' To reduce
the chances of foreign corruption of the President, only
natural-born citizens could be elected to that office. 7 To
reduce the chances of foreign corruption of the Senate age
and length-of-residency requirements were imposed.8 To
reduce the likelihood of factional corruption, the President
313. See generally Natelson, Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at
390-405.
314. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
315. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 76, supra note 2, at 395
(Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the ban on executive office-holding by
members of Congress "guards against the danger of executive influence upon
the legislative body"). This value seems to have been forgotten in some state
constitutions. In the author's state (Montana), for example, a large proportion of
the legislature typically consists of public employees or retired public employee-
pensioners. The author's observation is that those legislators almost never vote
against the interest of the agencies that pay their salaries or pensions. The
Founders abused such people with the epithet, "placemen." See, e.g., John
Williams, New York Convention (June 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 2, at 241; Tench Coxe, An American Citizen III, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER,
Sept. 29, 1788), reprinted in FRIENDS, supra note 2, at 467; Hugh Williamson,
Remarks on the New Plan of Government (Feb. 1788), reprinted in id. at 277.
316. U.S. CONST. art. II., § 1, cl. 7; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra
note 2, at 379-80 (Alexander Hamilton).
317. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
318. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 2, at 319 (James
Madison).
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was to be selected in the most impartial manner the drafters
could design.319
Anti-federalists agreed that public officials should be
loyal,3 2' but, on this point as well, contended that the Consti-
tution did not do a thorough enough job. We have seen that
"Brutus" averred that Congress would not be sufficiently
representative to ensure against self-dealing or the percep-
tion of same. 2' When federalists tried to reassure the public
by pointing out that one should not exaggerate official pro-
pensity to disloyalty, 22 the anti-federalist "A Newport Man"
opined:
319. John Dickinson, Fabius 11, PA. MERCURY, Apr. 15, 1787, reprinted in 17
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 124-25 (writing that the electoral
college was constructed so that "utterly vain will be the unreasonable
suggestions derived from partiality"); THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 2, at
352-53 (Alexander Hamilton) (defending the mode of election of the President as
protecting against "prostitut[ing] votes," "corruption," and "bias").
320. See, e.g., Cato III, supra note 157, at 474:
"It is natural," says Montesquieu, "to a republic to have only a small
territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist: in a large one, there are men
of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are too
great deposits to intrust in the hands of a single subject, an ambitious
person soon becomes sensible that he may be happy, great, and glorious
by oppressing his fellow citizens, and that he might raise himself to
grandeur, on the ruins of his country. In large republics, the public good
is sacrificed to a thousand views .. "
See also The Impartial Examiner I, supra note 280, at 420 (arguing as a "true
maxim that those, who are entrusted with the exercise of the higher powers of
government, ought to observe two essential rules: first in having no other view
than the general good of all without any regard to private interest; and
secondly, to take equal care of the whole body of the community, so as not to
favor one part more than another").
321. Supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
322. E.g., A Country Federalist, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Dec. 19, 1787,
reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 433 (James Kent)
(stating that "Itihere is a possibility indeed that rulers when seated in the
government by the hands of the people, may turn tyrants and abuse their
trust," but alleging that such a breach is unlikely because of sentiments of
gratitude, habits through education, philosophy, natural benevolence, and
possibility of defeat for reelection).
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We are told that the Trustees of our powers and freedom, being
mostly married men, and all of them inhabitants and proprietors
of the country, is an ample security against an abuse of power ....
Again, our country is compared to a ship of which we are all part
owners, and, from thence 'tis gravely concluded that no officer can
ever betray or abuse his trust; but that men will sacrifice the
public to their private interest, is a saying too well known to need
repeating, and the instances of designed shipwrecks, and ships run
away with by a combination of masters, supercargoes, and part
owners, is so great that nothing can equal them, but those
instances in which pretended patriots and politicians have raised
themselves and families to power and greatness, by destroying
that freedom, and those laws, they were chosen to defend." 3
D. The Duty of Impartiality
Sometimes there is a clash of interests among those
whom a fiduciary serves. In a private family trust, for exam-
ple, an investment may yield a high income for life tenants
while impairing the remaindermen's stake in the trust prin-
cipal. In a corporation, a proposed resolution may benefit one
class of shareholders while prejudicing another. When there
is a clash of interests, unless otherwise directed or author-
ized by the trust instrument, a fiduciary must manage so as
to avoid favoritism.324
The fiduciary duty of impartiality presents particular
challenges in the government setting, where conflicts of
interest within the citizenry are common. Yet the founding
generation valued no public trust duty more than impartial-
ity.3 2  Both federalists and anti-federalists condemned
323. A Newport Man, NEWPORT MERCURY, Mar. 3, 1788, reprinted in 4
STORING, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 252-53.
324. See sources cited supra notes 46-47.
325. John Adams, who tended to be out front, had expressed publicly these
views earlier than others in the founding generation. See, e.g., ADAMS,
WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 288-89 (writing under his "Novanglus" pseudonym of
1774); see also James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments (June 10, 1785), at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/amendIreligions43.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2004) (arguing
against a bill for assessing citizens for the support of religious establishments
on the ground that, "[als the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to
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government decisions that favored one or more "factions,"326
even if the favored group(s) comprised a majority of the
population. 27 For example, they condemned as breaches of
trust government actions creating "monopolies," by which
they meant trade restrictions disadvantaging some groups
for the enrichment of others.328 Federalists, such as Virginia
peculiar burdens, so it violates the same principle, by granting to others
peculiar exemptions" and praying that those who would pass the bill would not
"violate the trust committed to them"). Many writers on the Founding have
noted the contemporary dislike for "factions" or "parties," but few, if any, seem
to have connected this attitude to the broader public trust doctrine. This is
somewhat surprising, given the conspicuous connection between impartiality
and the trust doctrine in two of the most central works in the Founders' literary
canon: Cicero's de Officiis and Locke's On Civil Government. See supra notes 93
(Cicero), 161-63 (Locke) and accompanying text.
326. E.g., Noah Webster, A Citizen of America (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in
FRIENDS, supra note 2, at 383 (writing of the need for impartiality and calling it
a breach of trust for a member of Congress to vote for his own state's interest
rather than the public interest); A Farmer III, MD. GAZETrE, Mar. 7, 1788,
reprinted in 5 STORING, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 31 (an anti-federalist
praising officeholders who "have no local attachments, partial interests, or
private views to gratify"); Letter from James Madison to George Washington
(Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 408
(suggesting that granting monopolies would be a breach of trust and outside
Congress' enumerated powers); An Admirer of Anti-Federal Men, N.Y. DAILY
ADVERTISER, July 26, 1787, reprinted in 19 id. at 15 ("They [the friends of
liberty] see, with silent detestation, the low bias towards popularity, which
evidently influences the conduct of those, from whom we have a right to expect
examples of strict virtue and rigid impartiality .... [Moreover, during the war,]
no partial interests induced us to sacrifice continental benefits to individual or
even local advantages."); see also GARRY WILLS, JAMES MADISON 32-33 (2002)
(defining Madison's view of legislation as judicial-style arbitration "with neutral
umpires weighing competing interests, to strike a just balance").
327. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 2, at 43, 45 (James
Madison); William Grayson, Virginia Convention (June 18, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 491-92; see also JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 287
(Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1971) (1787) ("It may sound oddly [sic] to
say that the majority is a faction; but it is, nevertheless, literally just. If the
majority are partial to their own favour, if they refuse to deny [sic: should be
"grant"] a perfect equality to every member of the minority, they are a
faction .... ).
328. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 326, at
408 (suggesting that granting monopolies would be a breach of trust and
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Governor Edmund Randolph, quieted the fears of those who
thought the new government might cede territories in the
West by denying, in accordance with Whig doctrine, the
inherent power of government to cede some of its territory
without the consent of the inhabitants, for that would sacri-
fice the interests of some for the benefit of others.329 When
government did not act impartially, it was attributed to
conspiracies or "intrigue," "corruption,""33 or "undue influ-
ence" (note the trust term)3 1 among officeholders and one or
outside Congress' enumerated powers); see also Agrippa VI, MA. GAZETTE, Dec.
14, 1787, reprinted in 4 STORING, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 80,
available at http://www.constitution.org/afp/agrippa.htm (last visited Dec. 10,
2004) (an anti-federalist writer); Noah Webster, America, N.Y. DAILY
ADVERTISER, Dec. 31, 1787, reprinted in FRIENDS, supra note 2, at 171 (stating
that government should "prevent any exclusive rights").
See The Case of Monopolies, 11 Coke Rep. 84b, 86b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263
(1602) (holding a monopoly of playing cards to be contrary to law, partly on the
ground that "every grant made in grievance or prejudice of the subject is void").
The great proto-Whig jurist Sir Edward Coke had argued the case in favor of
the government, but used his position as the reporter of the case to praise the
decision. For a recent summary of the long Whig struggle against "monopolies,"
see Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6 CHAPMAN L. REV. 207, 209-
31 (2003).
329. Edmund Randolph, Virginia Convention (June 13, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT,
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 362-63, 504-05; see also id. at 501 (James Madison
speaking on restrictions on the British king's treaty power). For the ultra vires
nature of breaches of trust, see supra note 197 and accompanying text. For
Grotius' previous recognition of the same principles, see supra note 117.
330. E.g., James Madison, Journal, (July 17, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 31 (Col. Mason) ("It is curious to remark the different
language held at different times. At one moment we are told that the
Legislature is entitled to thorough confidence, and to indefinite power. At
another, that it will be governed by intrigue & corruption, and cannot be
trusted at all."); see also A Newport Man, supra note 323, at 252. The anti-
federalist author noted of federalist arguments that
Again, our country is compared to a ship of which we are all part
owners, and, from thence 'tis gravely concluded that no officer can ever
betray or abuse his trust; but that men will sacrifice the public to their
private interest, is a saying too well known to need repeating, and the
instances of designed shipwrecks, and ships run away with by a
combination of masters, supercargoes, and part owners ....
2004] THE PUBLIC TRUST 1153
more "factions," "combinations" or "juntos" seeking govern-
mental favors at common expense.332 Even when such
"corruption" was not technically illegal, it was a violation of
the public trust. On the other hand, the term "impartial"
seems to have had extremely favorable connotations.
The drafters of the Constitution were deeply concerned
about potential "corruption" in the proposed federal govern-
ment," and took pains to ensure that government remained
as impartial as possible-both toward citizens and toward
states. To promote the principle of impartiality among citi-
zens, apportionment of the House of Representatives was
based approximately on population.334 Representatives were
made numerous to render more difficult the creation of
"combinations" and "juntos" leading to "corruption."3 35 A
331. E.g., The Impartial Examiner III, VA. INDEP. CHRON., June 4, 1787,
reprinted in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1577 (stating that
undue influence leads to partiality).
332. The frequency of the use of these terms is captured by computer text
searches of the following: in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, the term "faction" is
used in this sense forty-four times, "combination" thirty times, and "junto"-
more of an anti-federalist term-once; in MORTON BORDEN, THE ANTIFEDERALIST
PAPERS (1965), an edited compilation of some of the best anti-federalist
productions (but about twenty-nine percent shorter than The Federalist),
"combination" appears fifteen times, "faction" ten, and "junto" six times. These
figures are approximate, because sometimes they (especially "combination")
may be used in different or overlapping senses. See also WILSON, supra note 2,
at 294 (stressing the need for impartiality in executive appointments and the
desirability, therefore, of a single executive to forestall "combinations").
333. See, e.g., James Madison, Journal (Sept. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2
FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 551:
Mr Govr Morris thought no other tribunal than the Senate could be
trusted. The Supreme Court were too few in number and might be
warped or corrupted. He was agst. [sic] a dependence of the Executive
on the Legislature, considering the Legislative tyranny the great
danger to be apprehended; but there could be no danger that the
Senate would say untruly on their oaths that the President was guilty
of crimes or facts, especially as in four years he can be turned out.
334. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
335. E.g., James Madison, Journal (Sept. 7, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 536; Wilson Nicholas, Virginia Convention (June 4,
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single rather than a plural executive was established." The
Constitution forbade the new government from passing bills
of attainder or ex post facto laws,3 7 granting titles of nobil-
ity,"' or abusing the charge of treason.39 The Senate was to
try impeachments,' in part because it was seen as the most
impartial forum for doing so."
To embody the principle of impartiality among states,
each state was to have two Senators.42 Direct taxes were to
be apportioned among the states according to a set
formula,' The federal capital was to be in no single state,3"
the better to ensure impartiality. 5 Congress was not permit-
ted to discriminate against the commerce in some states to
1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 12 ("[Fjor the more the
representatives increase in number, the greater the influence of the people in
the government . . . ."). John Dickinson was at first uncertain about the
advantages of numerosity, see Fabius II, supra note 319, at 122, but shortly
thereafter seemed to concede its desirability. Id. at 124.
336. WILSON, supra note 2, at 294.
337. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 (the ban on bills of attainder and ex post
facto laws). States were similarly forbidden. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
338. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. States were put under the same constraint.
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
339. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
340. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
341. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 2, at 647 (Alexander Hamilton)
(defending use of Senate as a court for impeachments because it will be "as
difficult as possible for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the
public good"). On the general impartiality of the Senate, see James Madison,
Journal (June 26, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 427-
28.
342. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1; see also Impartial, supra note 275, at *644,
*647 (defending the Senate as necessary to "restrain the large states from
having improper advantages over the small ones").
343. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
344. See id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.
345. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 2, at 222-23 (James Madison).
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the preference of others,346 and states were protected against
changes in the number of Senators347 or unwanted combina-
tions and divisions.348
Several clauses worked to promote impartiality toward
both citizens and states. Congress was restricted by the
General Welfare Clause, designed to prohibit taxes used to
fund projects serving primarily partial or local interests. 9
Partly to promote impartiality, the convention chose to cre-
ate a unitary rather than plural executive. 35 0 The executive's
veto power, and Congress' two-thirds override, were tools to
encourage enactment only of impartial legislation.35' The
346. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (apportionment of direct taxes); id. art. I, §
8, cl.1 (uniformity in imposts and excises); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (no preference
given to particular states in revenue or commerce).
347. U.S. CONST. art. V.
348. Id. art. IV, § 3.
349. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. On the original meaning and subsequent mis-
interpretation of this clause, see generally Natelson, General Welfare, supra
note 2.
350. Pierce Butler (June 2, 1787), in 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at
88 (speaking at the federal convention); id. at 139 (Elbridge Gerry, speaking at
the same convention); 2 id. at 31 (Gouverneur Morris stating of executive
officers, "Appointments made by numerous bodies, are always worse than those
made by single responsible individuals, or by the people at large.").
351. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 2, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton)
(saying that the veto "establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or
of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a
majority of that body") (emphasis added).
The President was an impartial force because, in the words of Madison, he
would be a "national officer, acting for and equally sympathising with every
part of the U. States [sic]." James Madison, Journal (July 21, 1787), reprinted in
2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 2, at 81. Cf James Monroe, Virginia
Convention Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 488 ("He ought to
depend on the people of America for his appointment and continuance in office;
he ought also to be responsible, in an equal degree, to all the states.").
The ability of the executive veto to ensure impartiality eventually was
undermined by the practice of "logrolling"-including multiple special interest
items in one bill. By 1861, the problem had been identified, and the drafters of
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Privileges and Immunities Clause prevented discrimination
352
among citizens because of state of residence. To ensure
impartiality in judging both among citizens and states fed-
eral judges were to hold office during good behavior35 and
Congress could not diminish any judge's compensation."4
Surveying the drafters' work after completion, "Curtius,"
a federalist writer, praised it as impartial-that "if any par-
tiality is shewn, it is in favor of the weak"3 5-and that in
certain particulars it followed the British model, "a Govern-
ment once justly dear to us-then let us enquire, where,
among foreign nations, are the people who may boast like
Britons? In what country is justice more impartially admin-
istered .. ,,356 Curtius exhorted his readers, "Unbiassed and
impartial, examine, then, for yourselves, how worthy that
the Confederate constitution included a "single subject" requirement. CONFED.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 20, available at http://www.us.constitution.net/csa.html#A/
sec9 (last visited Dec. 10, 2004) ("Every law, or resolution having the force of
law, shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.").
Many, if not most, states have such a requirement today. See, e.g., Van Bergen
v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995); Town of Brilliant v. City of Winfield,
752 So. 2d 1192 (Ala. 1999); State v. Fugate, 26 P.3d 802 (Ore. 2001).
352. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); see
also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1999) (discussing the Clause as
limiting discrimination by a state against non-residents); THE FEDERALIST No.
80, supra note 2, at 413-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (making clear that the clause
was designed to prevent both partiality and interstate conflict).
353. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 2,
at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (calling life tenure "the best expedient which can
be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws").
354. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 2,
at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Next to permanency in office, nothing can
contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for
their support .... In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will.").
355. Curtius I, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 29, 1787, reprinted in 19
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 63, 64.
356. Id. at 64.
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system of Government is, which the collected wisdom of the
nation has recommended to your acceptance."357
Yet again, anti-federalists agreed in principle, but not on
application. The anti-federalist "Impartial Examiner"
argued:
If it be a true maxim that those, who are entrusted with the
exercise of the higher powers of government, ought to observe two
essential rules: first in having no other view than the general good
of all without any regard to private interest; and secondly, to take
equal care of the whole body of the community, so as not to favor
onq part more than another: it is apparent that under the
proposed constitution, this general confederated society, made up
of thirteen different states, will have very little security for
obtaining an observance, either of the one, or of the other, rule."
More specific was the position of "Agrippa" (John
Winthrop), a Massachusetts anti-federalist: "I believe it is
universally true, that acts made to favour a part of the com-
munity are wrong in principle,"359 he wrote; "[t]he perfection
of government depends on the equality of its operation, as far
as human affairs will admit, upon all parts of the empire,
and upon all citizens. 36 ° In "Agrippa's" view, however, the
Constitution would not create an impartial government:
Congress would have authority to grant special privileges to
some people-such relics of the royal prerogative as exclu-
sive trading charters36' and other monopolies.362 (Madison
357. Id.
358. The Impartial Examiner I, supra note 280, at 420.
359. See Agrippa III, MA. GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 1787, reprinted in 4 STORING,
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 73-74.
360. Id. at 82; see also id. at 100 ("The first principle of a just government is,
that it shall operate equally.").
361. See id. at 80; see also id. at 104.
362. See id. at 86. For the same charge see also Sydney, To the Citizens of
the State of New York (June 13-14, 1788), in 6 STORING, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 2, at 112 (Robert Yates); George Mason, Objections to the Constitution (Oct.
7, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 350; cf. 5
HUME, supra note 2, at 114.
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disagreed, thinking the Constitution gave Congress no power
to so breach its trust.). 3 Further, taxation would impact the
states unequally.3" "In a republic," Agrippa wrote, "we ought
to guard, as much as possible, against the predominance of
any particular interest. It is the object of government to pro-
tect them all."365
Another opponent, "A Federal Republican," criticized the
Constitution for, in his view, not being impartial among
states. He condemned the abandonment of per capita state
voting in the House of Representatives: "Here is a change of
which the citizens of the United States, who are less gov-
erned by principles of private interest, than those of true and
impartial justice should beware."366
A related line of attack was the anti-federalist claim that
the new Congress would not be sufficiently numerous to pre-
vent "corruption." The "Address and Reasons of Dissent of
the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania To Their
Constituents" contended that
The representation is unsafe, because in the exercise of such great
powers and trusts, it is so exposed to corruption and undue
influence, by the gift of the numerous 'places of honor and
emoluments at the disposal of the executive; by the arts and
address of the great and designing; and by direct bribery.367
Much federalist effort was taken up in reassuring the
public that the Constitution would, in fact, promote imparti-
ality in government.6
363. See Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 326,
at 408.
364. See Agrippa VII, MA. GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 4 STORING,
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 83.
365. Agrippa XIV, MA. GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 1788, reprinted in id. at 105.
366. A Federal Republican, A Review of the Constitution Proposed by the
Late Convention (Oct. 28, 1787), in 3 id. at 71.
367. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention,
reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 618, 632.
368. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 2, at 48 (James Madison)
(opining that a federalized republic will weaken the interests of particular
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E. The Duty to Account
We have seen that, while there was not much difference
between English court party and country party thought on
the duties of rulers, those groups did differ as to whom rulers
were immediately accountable."9 All the Founders followed
the country party line that government officials should be
accountable to the people for breach of trust.37 ° They also
factions); id. No. 66, at 647 (Alexander Hamilton) (defending the use of the
Senate as a court for impeachments because it will be "as difficult as possible
for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good"); id. No.
68, at 352-53 (Alexander Hamilton) (defending the mode of election of the
President as protecting against "prostitu[ing] votes," "corruption," and "bias");
see also Curtius I, supra note 355, at 63; Impartial, supra note 275, at *644-46:
By this Constitution ... the intent of the Representative will correspond
with that of his constitutents. Every measure that is prejudiced to the
people will be equally so to those whom they appoint to govern them.
They cannot betray their electors without injuring themselves ....
Every social and generous affection will concur with the interest of the
Representatives, in animating them to an honest and faithful discharge
of their important trust.
369. See supra Part IV.C-D.
370. See, e.g., John Julius Pringle, South Carolina Convention (Jan. 16,
1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 270; John Marshall, Virginia
Convention (June 2, 1788), in 3 id. at 233; id. at 657 (setting forth Virginia's
proposed amendments to the Constitution, one of which would have stated,
"That all power is naturally invested in, and consequently derived from, the
people; that magistrates therefore are their trustees and agents, at all times
amenable to them."); see also William Paca, Amendment proposed in the
Maryland Convention (Apr. 29, 1788), reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 240 (setting forth the Maryland convention's rejected
amendments, which read in part, "That it be declared that all Persons
entrusted with the Legislative or Executive Powers of Government, are the
Trustees and Servants of the Public, and as such accountable for their Conduct.
."); A Citizen of the State of Maryland, Remarks Relative to a Bill of Rights
(Luther Martin, ed.), reprinted in id. at 92 (an anti-federalist, quoting Lord
Abingdon and writing that "for their due performance [legislators] are
accountable to those by whose conveyance the trust was made").
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were realistic enough about human nature to know that
there would be frequent breaches of trust.37'
If a public official committed a crime, he (immediately or
eventually)372 could be held accountable under the criminal
law.373 To breach one's public trust was not necessarily to
commit a crime, however. As Hamilton observed, "Men, in
371. See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 2, at 73-74 (Alexander
Hamilton):
Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of
that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple
proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that the
persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the
particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with
perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to
execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse
of this results from the constitution of human nature.
Id. No. 22, supra note 2, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton):
In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the
suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence and
power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to any
but minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to
exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to
overbalance the obligations of duty.
See also id. No. 62, supra note 2, at 321 (James Madison) ("It is a misfortune
incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other
governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their
constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust."); A Newport Man,
supra note 323, at 252 ("[B]ut that men will sacrifice the public to their private
interest, is a saying too well known to need repeating . . . ."); Samuel Willard,
Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 9, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2,
at 68 (stating that "where power had been trusted to men, whether in great or
small bodies, they had always abused it").
372. There is a constitutional dispute as to whether a President can be
prosecuted while in office, or if he must be removed first. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 2, at 263.
373. See, e.g., Edward Rutledge, South Carolina Convention (Jan. 16, 1788),
in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 276 ("If the President or the senators
abused their trust, they were liable to impeachment and punishment; and the
fewer that were concerned in the abuse of the trust, the more certain would be
the punishment.").
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public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to
render them unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in
such a manner as to make them obnoxious to legal punish-
ment."37 4 It was therefore necessary to devise ways to
respond to non-criminal breaches.
One way was to constitute the system to prevent most
breaches from happening. The Constitution contained vari-
ous devices of this sort. Although the drafters rejected term
limits,375 they did provide for frequent elections,376 which they
thought would be the most important mechanism for
promoting accountability. 7 They rejected religious tests,78
374. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 2, at 366 (Alexander Hamilton).
375. While "rotation in office" sometimes was justified on trust grounds, it
also was rejected on those grounds. See, e.g., Robert R. Livingston, New York
Convention (June 17, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 293 ("This
rotation is an absurd species of ostracism-a mode of proscribing eminent
merit, and banishing from stations of trust those who have filled them with the
greatest faithfulness.").
376. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (establishing two year terms for
representatives); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (six year terms for senators); id. art. II, § 1,
cl. 1 (establishing four year terms for the President).
377. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 57, supra note 2, at 295-96 (James
Madison):
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain
for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to
pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take
the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they
continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining
rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government. The means
relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy
are numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation
of the term of appointments as will maintain a proper responsibility to
the people.
See also id. No. 37, supra note 2, at 181 (Madison):
The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only
that all power should be derived from the people, but that those
intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short
duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period
the trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands.
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but they did require the President, members of Congress,
and other officeholders to take solemn oaths that they would
carry out their duties.379
Preventing breaches of trust was another reason for
dividing the federal government into three,38 ° and Congress
into two, branches.38 The unitary nature of the executive
378. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
At the Massachusetts ratifying convention, federalist Rev. Daniel Shute
explained why a religious test was rejected:
To establish a religious test as a qualification for offices in the proposed
federal Constitution, it appears to me, sir, would be attended with
injurious consequences to some individuals, and with no advantage to
the whole.
By the injurious consequences to individuals, I mean, that some, who,
in every other respect, are qualified to fill some important post in
government, will be excluded by their not being able to stand the
religious test; which I take to be a privation of part of their civil rights.
Nor is there to me any conceivable advantage, sir, that would result to
the whole from such a test. Unprincipled and dishonest men will not
hesitate to subscribe to any thing that may open the way for their
advancement, and put them into a situation the better to execute their
base and iniquitous designs. Honest men alone, therefore, however well
qualified to serve the public, would be excluded by it, and their country
be deprived of the benefit of their abilities.
In this great and extensive empire, there is, and will be, a great
variety of sentiments in religion among its inhabitants. Upon the plan
of a religious test, the question, I think, must be, Who shall be excluded
from national trusts?
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 118-19.
379. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; id. art. VI, cl. 3.
380. Alexander Hamilton, New York Convention (June 17, 1788), in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 398; John Julis Pringle, South Carolina
Convention (Jan. 16, 1788), in id. at 269.
381. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 2, at 321 (James Madison):
It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less
degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may
forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to
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would make it harder for politicians in executive positions to
shift responsibility to others." ' Further tending to prevent
breaches of trust were the President's power to require that
department chiefs put their opinions in writing3" and the
rule that money be spent only pursuant to a regular appro-
priations procedure.3 As trustees and agents for different
purposes,38' state officials and federal officials each were
charged with preventing the others' usurpations. 86
their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second
branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the
power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the
government.
See also Charles Pinckney, South Carolina Convention (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 256.
382. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 2, at 366 (Alexander Hamilton):
Men, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to
render them unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a
manner as to make them obnoxious to legal punishment. But the
multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in
either case.
383. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
384. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
385. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 2, at 243 (James Madison)
("The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and
trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for
different purposes."); see also Gilbert Livingston, New York Convention (June
17, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 388-89:
It will serve to impress both the general government, as well as the
particular state governments, with this important idea-that they
conjointly are the guardians of the rights of the whole American family,
different parts of the administration of the concerns of which being
intrusted to them respectively. In the one case, Congress, as the head,
will take care of the general concerns of the whole: in the other, the
particular legislatures, as the stewards of the people, will attend to the
more minute affairs.
386. Fabius, PENN. MERCURY (Apr. 17, 1788), reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 170-71 (John Dickinson):
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The Constitution contained provisions that could both
prevent and remedy breaches of trust, Besides discouraging
breach, frequent elections offered a way to remove those who
had not met their obligations. In the same prevent-and-
remedy category one might place (1) the nation's federal
structure,387 (2) the usually-public nature of legislative jour-
nals, 8 (3) the requirement that the President's reasons for
vetoing a bill be printed in one of the journals,389 and (4) the
courts' power to invalidate government actions that violated
the federal Constitution.39 ° The last was particularly impor-
tant as a remedy because legislators were not to be person-
In short, the government of each State is, and is to be, sovereign and
supreme in all matters that relate to each state only. It is to be
subordinate barely in those matters that relate to the whole; and it will be
their own faults, if the several states suffer the federal sovereignty to
interfere in things of their respective jurisdictions. An instance of such
interference with regard to any single state, will be a dangerous
precedent as to all, and therefore will be guarded against by all, as the
trustees or servants of the several states will not dare, if they retain
their senses, so to violate the independent sovereignty of their respective
states ....
387. On preventing, see generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 2,
(James Madison). On remedying, see id. No. 28 at 138 (Alexander Hamilton):
In a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become
usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it
consists, having no distinct government in each, can take no regular
measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms,
without concert, without system, without resource; except in their
courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal
authority, can too often crush the opposition in embryo. The smaller the
extent of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form a
regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to
defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of
their preparations and movements, and the military force in the
possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part
where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a
peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular
resistance.
388. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
389. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
390. See id. art. VI, cl. 2; see also supra note 286.
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ally liable for their votes on the floor of Congress.391 That may
be why many vocal members of the founding generation
looked forward to judges defending vigorously the integrity
of the Constitution against overreaching federal officials. 9
Impeachment was the principal punitive measure asso-
ciated in the public mind with breach of trust.393 At the
national convention, Madison
thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for
defending the Community agst the incapacity, negligence or
perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his
service, was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity
after his appointment. He might pervert his administration into a
scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to
foreign powers. The case of the Executive Magistracy was very
distinguishable, from that of the Legislative or of any other public
body, holding offices of limited duration. It could not be presumed
that all or even a majority of the members of an Assembly would
either lose their capacity for discharging, or be bribed to betray,
their trust .... In the case of the Executive Magistracy which was
to be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption
391. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 2, at 347 (Alexander Hamilton)
("[T]he members of [the Senate] should be exempt from punishment for acts
done in a collective capacity.").
392. See supra note 286. Thus, the historical facts are quite different from
the suggestions, occasionally heard, that the U.S. Supreme Court invented
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137 (1803).
393. In addition to the sources cited immediately infra, see, e.g., Edward
Rutledge, South Carolina Convention (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 276 (referring to impeachment as a remedy for breach of public
trust); Gen. Charles Coatsworth Pinckney, South Carolina Convention (Jan. 17,
1788), in id. at 281 (same); Publicola, Address to the Freemen of North Carolina
(Mar. 27, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 497
(stating that remedy for abuse of trust is impeachment); HANSON, supra note
279, at 536 (stating that exceeding one's powers is a breach of trust and
implying, although not stating, that impeachment is the remedy); Americanus,
VA. INDEP. CHRONICLE (Dec. 5, 1787), reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 200-01, 203 (stating, after noting that President was to be the
servant of the people, that the remedy for exceeding power would be
impeachment).
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was more within the compass of probable events, and either of
them might be fatal to the Republic.394
Gouverneur Morris, who at one time had doubts about
the wisdom of including an impeachment clause, changed his
mind shortly after hearing Madison:
Mr. Govr. Morris... was now sensible of the necessity of
impeachments, if the Executive was to continue for any time in
office. Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life
interest, much less like one having an hereditary interest in his
office. He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust;
and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the
danger of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without being
able to guard agst it by displacing him.39
Under the force of such arguments, the drafters provided
in the Constitution for a process of impeachment and
removal from office.396
In ensuing debate, Alexander Hamilton underscored the
role that impeachment would play as a remedy for breach of
public trust.397 Moreover, he defended the Constitution's
scheme for trials in the Senate, since that body had the
necessary independence to make a fair determination.399
394. James Madison, Journal (July 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 65-66; see also A Citizen of Philadelphia, Remarks on
the Address of Sixteen Members (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 303 (federalist author argues for impeachment as a
remedy for "corruption"). On the contemporary meaning of "corruption," see
supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
395. James Madison, Journal (July 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 68.
396. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
397. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 2, at 338 (Alexander Hamilton):
A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not
more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly
elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the
abuse or violation of some public trust.
398. Id. No. 66 at 346-47 (Alexander Hamilton):
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As was true of other public trust issues, the anti-feder-
alists firmly agreed on the principle of accountability, but
thought the Constitution was defective in that regard: the
terms were too long,3" there would be an insufficient identity
of interest between officeholders and their constituents, °° the
powers of the federal government were not sufficiently
restricted, 0 ' and the courts might not have sufficient "forti-
A fourth objection to the Senate in the capacity of a court of
impeachments, is derived from its union with the Executive in the
power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would constitute the
senators their own judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious
execution of that trust.
The truth is, that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom and to
the necessary independence of the deliberations of the body, that the
members of it should be exempt from punishment for acts done in a
collective capacity; and the security to the society must depend on the
care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their
interest to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible
for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.
399. See, e.g., Cato V, N.Y. J. (Nov. 22, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 184 (favoring annual elections).
400. See, e.g., Centinel I, supra note 249, at 331 ("I believe it will be found that
the form of government, which holds those entrusted with power in the greatest
responsibility to their constituents, the best calculated for freemen."); Brutus III,
N.Y. J. (Nov. 15, 1787), reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
256, 314 (complaining that small representation will encourage "corruption").
401. Anti-federalists assailed three granted powers in particular: (1) the
General Welfare Clause, e.g., John Williams, New York Ratifying Convention
(1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 338; Letter From Silas Lee to
George Thatcher, Jan. 23, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 782; (2) the Taxation Clause, e.g., Mr. Bodman, Massachusetts
Ratifying Convention (1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 60; and (3)
the Necessary and Proper Clause, e.g., George Mason, Objections of the Hon.
George Mason to the Proposed Federal Constitution, in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 494, 496; Robert Whitehill, Pennsylvania Convention Debates
(Nov. 30, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 426; Letter From
William Russell to William Fleming, Jan. 25, 1788, reprinted in 8 id. at 323-24
(claiming that clause would give Congress plenary power).
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tude" to strike down unconstitutional usurpations.4 "2 They
worried that those great engines of government accountabil-
ity-freedom of speech and press-might not be sufficiently
protected."' Accordingly, the final constitutional bargain
provided for a bill of rights as an additional assurance of
accountability.
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
When a court interprets a constitutional provision of
uncertain meaning, it should, as Justice Breyer opined,
consider the "handful of general purposes"' ' behind the
document. If one possible interpretation complies with the
ideals the Founders sought to implement while a second does
not, then the first is to be favored. We have seen that one of
the Founders' "general purposes" was to construct a govern-
ment that would, to the extent practicable, operate according
to certain fiduciary norms.
This Article is primarily a work of constitutional history.
It is not within its scope to engage in a detailed discussion of
how the public trust doctrine may affect interpretation of
particular constitutional provisions. In other fora, however,
the question is worthy of detailed examination. In a recent
article, I applied public trust analysis to the General Welfare
Clause.0 ' In this Part, I summarize my conclusions there,
402. Patrick Henry, Virginia Convention (1787), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 324-25:
The honorable gentleman did our [Virginia] judiciary honor in saying
that they had firmness to counteract the legislature in some cases. Yes,
sir, our judges opposed the acts of the legislature. We have this
landmark to guide us. They had fortitude to declare that they were the
judiciary, and would oppose unconstitutional acts. Are you sure that
your federal judiciary will act thus?
403. See, e.g., Address of the Seceding Assemblymen, Oct. 2, 1788, reprinted
in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 296 (press); Centinel I, supra
note 249, at 329 (speech and press).
404. Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
405. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, discussed in Natelson, General Welfare,
supra note 2.
1168 [Vol. 52
THE PUBLIC TRUST
and then suggest other avenues scholars may wish to
explore.
A. The General Welfare Clause
The Constitution grants Congress the "Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States. 40 6 Some commentators have interpreted
this provision as granting open-ended power to Congress to
legislate for whatever it deems the "general welfare., 4°7 The
Supreme Court, while rejecting this position, has ruled that
the Clause grants Congress open-ended authority to spend
for what Congress deems the "general welfare."" We have
seen, however, that at the time the Constitution was
adopted, the phrase "general welfare" was associated with a
trust-style restriction on government power. The phrase was
used in promoting the view that an exercise of government
authority was legitimate only if it advanced the general
welfare." 9
My study of the history behind the General Welfare
Clause led me to conclude that the portion of the Taxation
Clause following the word "Excises" was not designed to
grant any power at all.41' Like other qualifying phrases in
Article I, Section 8,11 it served to limit the grant immediately
406. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
407. The various interpretations, and the original purpose, of this clause are
discussed in Natelson, General Welfare, supra note 2.
408. The Supreme Court adopted this position by dicta in United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), and has followed it in cases such as South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127
(1947), Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) and Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
409. Supra note 272 and accompanying text.
410. Natelson, General Welfare, supra note 2.
411. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (requiring bankruptcy legislation to be
"uniform"); id. cl. 8 (impliedly limiting the power to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts" to copyright and patent powers); id. cl. 12 (limiting
military appropriations to two years); id. cl. 16 (restricting federal control of the
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preceding-i.e., the taxing power. The idea was to implement
the fiduciary duty of impartiality412 by assuring that
Congress could acquire revenues designated only for projects
of general benefit, not for projects benefiting primarily locali-
ties or special interests.
B. Impeachment and Removal from Office
The Constitution authorizes the House of Representa-
tives to impeach federal officers for "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors."413 The Constitution designates the Senate
as the court for trial. 14 There is a long-standing interpreta-
tive dispute over whether an impeachable "Misdemeanor"
must constitute a violation of criminal law.415 Although the
answer is far from certain,"6 the founding generation's
militia); id. cl. 17 (limiting the capital district to ten miles square); see also infra
Part VI.B (discussing the limiting force of the word "proper" in the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
412. Natelson, General Welfare, supra note 2, at 53.
413. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
414. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
415. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 278.
This dispute flared up again during the time leading up to and during the
impeachment of President Clinton. See, e.g., L. Darnell Weeden, Essay: The
Clinton Impeachment Indicates a Presidential Impeachable Offense Is Only
Limited by Constitutional Process and Congress' Political Compass Directive, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2499, 2500-01 (2001); Gary L. McDowell, "High Crimes
and Misdemeanors": Recovering the Intentions of the Founders, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 626 (1999).
416. For example, at one point, Blackstone suggests that all misdemeanors
are crimes. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that "crime" and
"misdemeanor" are words "which, properly speaking, are mere synonymous
terms"). But see id. at 122 (stating that one can be impeached for
maladministration). Moreover, the respectable anti-federalist writer "Brutus"
clearly suggested that a mere lack of care or undue expansion of powers would
not be a ground for impeachment, Brutus X!, N.Y.J. (Dec. 27, 1788), reprinted in
15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 113, at 512.
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devotion to the public trust doctrine supports the view that
impeachment was to be a potential response to any signifi-
cant breach of fiduciary duty.
Accordingly, at the federal convention Madison listed as
impeachable offenses some outside the criminal law. 17
During the ratification debate, Hamilton affirmed that
impeachment was the remedy for breach of public trust,18
and that one could violate that trust without committing a
crime. 9 Other contemporary writers suggested the same.
2 1
Thus, a public trust interpretation of the Constitution
might support impeachment and removal of an official for
such non-criminal acts as violating the fiduciary duty of
care.
C. The Necessary and Proper Clause
Public trust doctrine similarly can help us address the
age-old question of what the word "proper" means in the
417. Supra note 391 and accompanying text (including as potential
breaches, "incapacity, negligence or perfidy").
418. See supra note 397 and accompanying text.
419. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
420. E.g., Aristides, Remarks on the Proposed Plan (Jan. 31, 1788), reprinted
in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 279, at 536 (strongly implying such);
BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 121 (stating that an officer can be impeached for
mere "maladministration"); FRIENDS, supra note 2, at 101 (Tench Coxe, stating
that it would be an impeachable offense to violate states' rights or offend
against the peace and dignity of the commonwealth), 472 (same, stating, "If
convicted on impeachment ... he cannot be fined, imprisoned or punished, but
only may be disqualified from doing public mischief by losing his office, and his
capacity to hold another. If the nature of his offense, besides its danger to the
country, should be criminal in itself.., he may be tried for such crime."); see
also id. at 385 (Noah Webster, stating that Senators may be impeached for
"malpractices"), 393 (same, stating that officers who violate the General Welfare
Clause are subject to impeachment).
Samuel Johnson's contemporary dictionary contains the following definition
of misdemeanor: "Offense; ill-behaviour; something less than an atrocious
crime." SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755) (no
pagination).
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Necessary122 and Proper Clause.421  In McCulloch v.
Maryland, the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief
Justice John Marshall (who had served as a federalist
spokesman at the Virginia ratifying convention), estab-
lished that "necessary" does not mean a law must be strictly
necessary. A law can be legally "necessary" if only reasona-
bly necessary or convenient.42 This is consistent with the
private fiduciary doctrine insulating ordinary exercises of
discretion from judicial review."'
As to the additional phrase "and proper," Marshall
offered only a clue. Although he emphasized that the Clause
as a whole was there primarily to grant rather than limit
power,2 5 he also suggested that to be within the scope of the
grant, the law must be must be proper or "appropriate." '426 If
so, then "and proper" signals a qualification on the power to
legislate, much as the General Welfare Clause signals a
limit on the power to tax.427
421. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power "To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
422. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
423. 17 U.S. at 413 ("[W~e find that it [necessary] frequently imports no
more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another.").
424. See supra note 50.
425. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 419-20; cf THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 2,
at 158-59 (Alexander Hamilton) (opining that the Clause really adds no
substantive power at all).
426. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 ("all means which are appropriate").
427. See supra Part VI.A.
Actually, the Clause was designed to be, and was sold to the ratifying public
as, neither a grant nor a limitation but a mere rule of construction. The "grant"
part of the Clause was a duplicated power given elsewhere in the Constitution,
and the "limitation" was a recital of a fiduciary restriction the founders believed
inherent in all legitimate government. See Robert G. Natelson, Necessary and
Proper, supra note 2 (forthcoming 2005) for a fuller discussion.
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As to the nature of the qualification: If a "general
purpose"428 of the Constitution is to erect a fiduciary gov-
ernment, then any law violating fundamental fiduciary
norms is not a "proper" one. By this interpretation, one
effect of Necessary and Proper Clause is to place such a law
outside Congressional authority. Similarly, since a statute
cannot authorize a breach of trust, then any administrative
action pursuant to statute, but constituting a breach, is also
ultra vires. As it turns out this interpretation also has sig-
nificant historical support.29
If the term "and proper" refers to the requirement that
Congressional legislation meet fiduciary norms, then the
Necessary and Proper Clause imposes a duty of impartial-
ity-or, as it usually is called in modern constitutional
parlance, "equal protection." The Fourteen Amendment
explicitly imposes equal protection standards on the
states 430 but not on the federal government. In 1954 the
Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause as applying some equal protection require-
428. Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
429. Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2.
430. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 applies only to the states ("[N]or shall any
State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws").
The Equal Protection Clause is only one example of the Constitution's ad hoc
application of trust-style duties to the states. See also, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §
10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or
grant any Title of Nobility."); id. amend. XIII (denying the states the power to
recognize slavery); id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."); id. amend. XIV, § 2 (protecting pro-rata
representation); id. amend. XV (prohibiting denial of the right to vote due to
race); id. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex.").
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ments to the federal government. 431 This holding can be
questioned on several grounds, not the least of which is that
there is no textual basis for it. 43 If, however, the Necessary
and Proper Clause applies trust standards to congressional
(and therefore administrative) decision making, then Fifth
Amendment "equal protection" is largely, if not entirely,
superfluous.
D. Discrete and Insular Minorities and the Due Process
Clause: One Possible Implication
We now come full circle to the question of how govern-
ment treats discrete and insular minorities-at issue in
Lawrence.433 That case invalidated a state rather than a
federal statute. On the other hand, if the Constitution
imposes trust duties on the federal government, then
Congress is required to comply with even more stringent
normative standards than are the states. So federal laws
designed to harm particular groups are at least as vulner-
able to constitutional challenge as comparable state laws.
Discriminatory federal legislation not invalid under
some other Constitutional provision currently is reviewed
under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In a due
process examination, the court balances the justification for
the statute with the nature of the disabilities the statute
imposes. Yet this due process jurisprudence has yielded
grossly disparate treatment of different "discrete and insu-
431. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause reads, "No person shall .... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
432. On the contrary, the separate guarantees of equal protection and due
process in the Fourteenth Amendment suggest that one is not contained in the
other.
The Boling court's justification for its holding was short and cursory.
Professor Bernard Siegen has argued, however, that at least in the economic
sphere there is some warrant for the use of the due process clause to assure
equal protection. Siegen, supra note 2, at 77-81. Discussion of this issue is
beyond the scope of this article.
433. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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lar minorities."434 Through the use of fluctuating standards
of review and prioritization of constitutional rights, due
process jurisprudence has come to embody the notions that
(1) all citizens are equal, but some citizens are more equal
than others and (2) all constitutional rights are equal, but
some rights are more equal than others.
The Supreme Court has defended this course of adjudi-
cation on the ground that some groups need less judicial
protection because they enjoy more political muscle.3
Whatever the theoretical merits of this approach,437 the
current of actual cases does not always flow in that direc-
tion. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has bestowed
heightened protection on groups well-organized politically
and unlikely to disappear-as it did in Lawrence"-while
denying it to groups liable to be destroyed by the very
legislation the Court sustains.39
434. The quoted language derives from the famous "footnote 4" in United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
435. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1945), available at http://www.
online-literature.com/orwell/animalfarm/10/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2004) ("ALL
ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN
OTHERS").
436. Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(justifying deferential rational basis review on the ground that "the
Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be
rectified by the democratic processes.").
437. The merits seem debatable. The Constitution is a document for all
citizens all the time, not merely for who happen at the moment to be
underrepresented in the political process.
438. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). See also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that homosexuals, also protected in this
case, comprised "a politically powerful minority").
439. Thus, in Carolene Products, the Supreme Court sustained a statute
enacted at the behest of the wealthy and powerful dairy industry. See Miller,
supra note 2, at 404. The victimized company, Carolene Products, was
"relegated to a marginal legal existence," id. at 413, although on altered facts it
later recovered the ability to sell its product. Id. at 415.
Other examples of how the courts' refusal to protect economic minorities can
result in their entire or near destruction include New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
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The incongruities are particularly glaring in cases where
the challenged legislation was directed against groups
distinguished by alterable characteristics -that is, by char-
acteristics such as source of sustenance, place of residence,
religion, and general lifestyle. In U.S. Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno,"' for example, the Supreme Court in-
validated a federal statute denying food stamps to unrelated
persons in the same household because it found that one
purpose of the legislation was to attack people who followed
the "hippy" lifestyle. As we Children of the Sixties recall, the
"hippy lifestyle" was a product of voluntary decisions to en-
gage in promiscuity and drug use, while living at the ex-
pense of others. Yet the court defended this subculture with
a heightened rational basis test: "rational basis with bite." 1
When urged to protect groups that are trying to earn
their own livings, the modern Court has expressed no
similar solicitude. It applies a much weaker version of the
"rational basis test"442 when reviewing statutes that throw
people out of formerly-lawful work, or otherwise upset
economic relationships. As observed by Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky, since the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Carolene Products.. nearly seventy years ago, "not
U.S. 297 (1976) (sustaining ordinance against newly-established street vendors,
who then were forced out of business) and Kafka v. Hagener, 176 F. Supp. 2d
1037 (D. Mont. 2001) (sustaining on "rational basis" test a state law destroying
all established Montana game farm businesses).
440. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
441. This version of the rational basis test is discussed in CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 2, at 417.
That the court in Moreno applied the more exacting version of the rational
basis test is shown by its failure to search assiduously for unstated goals the
legislation might serve. It refused to consider, as abandoned by the government,
the basis of protection of morality, 413 U.S. at 535 n.7, and it failed to mention
the possible goal of the promotion of marriage and the benefits fostered by
marriage.
442. The rational basis test sustains laws if they have some conceivable
connection to a legitimate government purpose, even if there is no evidence that the
legislature ever considered that purpose. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 414-15.
443. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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one state or federal economic regulation has been found
unconstitutional as infringing liberty of contract as pro-
tected by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteen
Amendments."444
Professor Geoffrey P. Miller has outlined the policy
consequences of this course of adjudication: "[Caroline
Products] freed the forces of interest group politics from the
stumbling block of the federal courts"-resulting in "the
unrivaled primacy of interest groups in American politics
... No wonder modern due process jurisprudence has
been subject to withering criticism."6
If the courts were to apply public trust doctrine to consti-
tutional interpretation, a very broad area of legislative discre-
tion would remain, 7 but the discordant standards of review
probably would have to be abandoned. The judicial permis-
siveness of Carolene Products intercedes little check when
government imposes barriers to competition designed to
enrich some interests at the expense of others:"8 Under the
444. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 491.
Given that the Fifth Amendment is deemed to include a federal equal
protection requirement, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and the
continued viability of substantive due process in many other areas,
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 638-39; cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (homosexual sodomy), this is an extraordinary record.
445. Miller, supra note 2, at 399.
446. E.g., Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice
Souter and the Mistranslation of the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 3 (1999); Siegan, supra note 2, at 75-119; Steven M. Simpson, Judicial
Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 173 (2003).
447. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 50 (trustees have wide
fields of non-reviewable discretion).
448. On the role of this case as a protector of special interest legislation, see
Miller, supra note 2.
For Supreme Court cases decided according to the same principles, but
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, see New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (sustaining ordinance effectively throwing out of
business pushcart vendors who had not previously operated in the New Orleans
French Quarter for at least eight years); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963) (upholding law putting non-attorney debt adjustors out of business);
2004] 1177
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current interpretive regime, proof that a legislative majority
acted to loot its political foes and enrich its friends is simply
irrelevant, so long as the majority, theoretically, "could have"
acted for some "conceivable" legitimate state interest."9
That this accorded with the Founders' vision is un-
likely. On the contrary, it was precisely legislation of this
sort that the Founders denounced as a profound breach of
the public trust.
4 °
VII. CONCLUSION
As Justice Breyer argues, the Constitution must be in-
terpreted in light of its "handful of general purposes." This
Article has demonstrated that one of those general purposes
was to erect a government in which public officials would be
bound by fiduciary duties to honor the law, exercise reason-
able care, remain loyal to the public interest, exercise their
power in a reasonably impartial fashion, and account for
violations of these duties. This does not mean that the
Constitution authorizes judges to assume the management
of government from elected politicians. It does mean, how-
ever, that the Constitution was designed to foster among
public officials the same tenets of decency and care that the
law imposed on their counterparts in private life.
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (sustaining law benefiting
optometrists and ophthalmologists at the expense of opticians and consumers);
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (sustaining
anti-competitive licensing arrangement); Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at
536-38.
449. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
450. For the public trust duty of impartiality as protecting against such
arrangements, see supra note 326 and accompanying text.
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